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REFLECTIONS

UPON THE LATE

REVOLUTIONS IN EUROPE.

REFLECTIONS

UPON

THE LATE REVOLUTIONS

In Europe.

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BY THE

MARQUIS DE SALVO, &c. &c.

E tu soggiunse del tuoi di venturi
Osi tanto sperar quanto non lice.

F.

Le monde est inepte à se guérir. Il est si impatient de ce qui le presse qu'il ne vise qu'à s'en deffaire sans regarder à quel prix. Nous voyons, par mille exemples, qu'il se guérit ordinairement à ses dépens. La décharge du mal présent n'est pas guarison, s'il n'y a, en général, amendement de condition.

MONTAIGNE, Lib. iii. Chap. ix.

R R - f - 23

London:

PRINTED FOR JOHN BOOTH, DUKE STREET,

PORTLAND PLACE.

1824.

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TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH.

REFLECTIONS

UPON THE LATE

REVOLUTIONS IN EUROPE.

CHAPTER I.

Sect. I.

OF REVOLUTIONS IN GENERAL.

With the numerous great and instructive lessons of experience before our eyes, we should reflect upon them each moment, if we would form a correct opinion of political events: it is them alone that we are to consult, if we wish to speak with frankness to those men who, having reckoned only upon the promised results of the principles they had set forth, are surprised to find their plans frustrated, without being able to comprehend how the event has contradicted their calculations. Those who

wish to speak of past events, must assume faithful observation and discriminating judgment for their rule.

If we reflect attentively upon the writings of the present day, we shall soon be convinced, that although possessed of eloquence, of talent, and of zeal, the distinguished writers who think they devote themselves to the true interests of nations, and that they are their defenders and their advocates, fail very often in their voluntary enterprise, by confiding in speculations which they found upon abstract theories and systems: thus they are led to speak, as if by proclamation, of the rights of nations, of the inviolability and the extent of those rights, but they seldom point out how they shall be guaranteed or consolidated. Most of the speeches of those men of the present age, who are remarkable for their attainments or their eminent talents, bear some resemblance to prophecies enunciated during moments of fervour. Their tone of prophecy,

animated by the vigor of enthusiasm, would produce a noble effect, if such facts did not result therefrom as destroy the charm of the most beautiful arguments, and the expectation of the most ingenious combinations.

It is to political liberty, and to that idol alone, that men are impatient to render the most signal homage. But in boasting of its triumphs, no one takes the trouble to examine how far it can be defended and upheld by those nations for whom it is invoked, and in what degree it may prove beneficial to them. We shall have it in our power to devote ourselves with as much zeal, and with far greater discernment, to the cause of humanity, and to become useful to our own country and to other nations, if in consulting the progress of events, we can enable ourselves to discriminate the true sources of the late Revolutions that have failed so much in answering the expectations of our political prophets, if we are willing to appreciate the conduct of the men who, becoming the temporary depo-

sitaries of the powerful will of the people, have failed in their prescribed commission, and employed their authority to destroy the very hope which they had themselves created; and if finally we would examine how and in what cases reliance may be had on the will of the people sought to be excited into re-action, the success of which can be ensured only by a general desire for, and a true knowledge of, public liberty, (which is an extremely vague term with two-thirds of the people, and very dangerous when it becomes a pretence for ambitious men to overturn every thing and thrust themselves into the place of whatever has been previously established); then it is that the writings and the counsels of men who have the welfare of civil institutions, and the general good of society sincerely at heart, shall be able to point out the true means of preventing that lamentable termination of affairs, when power is employed only to engender anarchy and add to oppression.

In politics, as in morals or physics, we should attend to *facts*, and keep them constantly in view in our search after the causes and circumstances out of which they have sprung: for it is only by comparison that other results can be foreseen without the danger of wandering, or of falling into notions of a speculative nature. Theories, vague and systematic ideas, cannot be found to apply to men in their individual any more than in their collective capacity: a safe judgment is to be formed in no other way than by a steady consideration of the attitude and the moral progress of nations, when they assume and are to exhibit a political character. Instead of following this, so evidently the most simple course, consequences are drawn from the progress of knowledge and civilisation, and it is not considered that such progress is invariably of a relative nature, not only as respects the geographical position of each country, but also its political and moral position; so that the same degree of knowledge

extended over different nations, will be productive of different results. The words *liberty and national representation* are understood or interpreted rather according to the private interests of each, than according to their real meaning and their real value. It is undeniable, however, that the only truths adapted to the comprehension of all classes of society are those that immediately relate to the advantage of each individual; but as to the utility to be derived from results, that, in short, which is expected from the future, it is not sufficiently felt, nor is it therefore sufficiently the object of all classes in a nation; and as whatever is not much understood nor much sought after, cannot be warmly maintained nor defended, it is a very false notion to suppose that the mass of the people possess a strong moral power, merely because the human mind shall have made rapid strides in arts, in sciences, or in reasoning. It were fitter to inquire how far civilisation and knowledge have given to nations a fixed energy

of public sentiment, adequate to the purpose of forming what is called a national character: this course, at once a safer and a more rational one, would lead to a positive result, to a knowledge of the new wants that are created in the most civilised societies.

We are presented by the history of the last thirty years with very striking pictures, from which we may derive the solution of this remarkable problem—whether nations are acquainted with the means of obtaining what they seek for, and whether they know by what means to preserve what they obtain. The occurrences that preceded and followed the French revolution, a revolution which astonished all nations who dreaded or partook of its delirium without sharing in its crimes, afforded more examples, and more facts of a tendency to explain the political phenomena that have caused the mass of any nation to seize and administer the executive authority, than have been produced by all preceding ages.

Each year of that period which closed the last century and saw the present one commence, forms a truly interesting epocha. In this short space of time, it may have been observed to what cause was owing the moral rank that each nation has attained: there will be no difficulty in deciding whether a greater development of moral faculties has been produced by events, or whether events have followed as a consequence of the development of those faculties. We shall be enabled with the aid of some judicious observations, and of a careful study of that extraordinary period, to decide by the evidence of results, whether nations ought to act as they have done in Spain, at Naples, in Piedmont, and in Portugal, or whether they should have pursued a different course, since that which they have adopted has only tended to humble them, and to sink them deeper into misfortune.

Such has been the main object of my enquiries; such is the purpose of this Essay.

Sect. II.

CONTINUATION.

Powers that are established and guaranteed by the sanction of time, naturally assume from these advantages, the right of being considered as the arbitrators upon any question connected with the destinies of a people.

It is imagined that the main object of civilisation, or rather of reasoning, should be partly to remodel an administration established by such powers, and to secure a participation of rights; but it can only be changed by being destroyed or modified; its destruction requires a general movement, partaking of insurrection; for modifying it, nothing more is wanting than a language sanctioned by the aid of reason, which ever carries in its train the knowledge of duties, and a correct discrimination between good and evil.

The first is a course of violence, which, so far from securing advantages to society, would tend to disorganise and give it a retrograde impulse; for after employing force against the established order of things, and giving a prominent place to anarchy, no other result shall have been obtained than an organised reaction, mixed up with the elements of the first opposition. It will be seen in the succeeding chapters, that a revolt becomes next to impossible in the present state of European politics, and that, admitting its eventual success, it would fail of its intended object. What remains then, but the second course?—and this may justly be called the result of civilisation and of knowledge.

If we study and analyse the political changes that have occurred at various periods in the history of nations, it will be seen, that when existing powers have relinquished privileges incompatible with the moral attitude of society, they have never yielded but to enlightened

remonstrances and calm reasoning. These changes have been effected without insurrection or revolt. Each century has obtained in this way fresh conquests on behalf of humanity; such conquests, however, were owing to the invisible operations which reason directs against abuses. No doubt that if the passions of men had been satisfied with the simple progress of universal knowledge, and had trusted for a change in obnoxious institutions to that progress, and to the advancement of wealth, which gives, as it were, a popular tide to all institutions, nations would have gained their cause, kings and governors would have continued to enjoy respect, and some degree of power would have imperceptibly flowed down to the various classes of society, without losing any of its consideration or of its august character. Thus without openingly claiming a share of power, nations would have acquired the exercise of certain rights, until then unenjoyed, as the necessary consequence of a wiser and a more moderate course.

Have not the alterations introduced in many codes, from the earliest institutions, in the kingdoms of modern Europe, been the work of that reason, which, according to Montesquieu, although weak, is ever triumphant! Are not all those laws that have substituted the scales of justice for the caprice of arbitrary sway, been owing to that universal language which has often enlightened the conscience of princes by the remonstrances of able judges and ministers, or by the threatening picture presented to them of the people's sufferings, which, when made known, have been softened or removed! Has not the subversion of the feudal system, with its frightful appendage, been owing in a great measure to the progress of knowledge and of wealth? Has not tyranny yielded to the power and influence of morals? Is not superstition compelled to fly those countries where religion is extending its instruction, and to seek shelter amongst the most barbarous and most ignorant nations? Has it been found necessary, with the view of

destroying absurd customs, to conspire or to run into open revolt? If the intrinsic power of human reason, though less hostile and less dangerous, has proved to be more energetic than revolts are, let us examine why the destinies of nations have not been left to its workings, as if nature could be required to produce, instantaneously as it were, those results which it has confided to the unerring march of time. Let us enquire whether those men who fancied they spoke the cause of humanity, have not been carried away by a mistaken zeal; whether in the search after an unattainable object, the results so infallible and so advantageous to the public good which they anticipated, were not drawn from delusive calculations. Let us see whether in the direction given to the public mind, due attention has been had to the general will, the expression of which may be easily collected from the nature of the first results; whether it has been well considered how far the established powers might be changed;

whether, in short, any dependance could be placed upon the effects that were contemplated; and whether proper means were devised for realising the chimerical objects that were aimed at. We place out of sight the possibility that a few madmen might cherish the idea of establishing anarchy upon the total overthrow of a legitimate power.

These considerations, which will be founded upon the experience of the late years, will lead us to discover how ill-judged has been every attempt hitherto made, and how guarded we should be against the return of similar errors. We may then solve without difficulty this great question:—Why do not nations, with their numerical strength, obtain what they seem to wish for? Why cannot the will of the mass of the people triumph over that of individuals? Nevertheless, this fact which has stood the test of experience, affords us a result totally different from the infallible calculations of numbers; and must convince us, that physical

strength, if wielded to maintain an opinion and to acquire political rights, is invariably dependant upon moral strength; whilst the latter proceeds only from a calm knowledge of the true interests of each individual, a strength which can neither be known nor calculated but by the expression of the general will of all classes.

Previous, however, to the events that have occurred within the last four years, was this moral strength so disposed as to lead to the expectation of a favorable result? For the object in view being the advantage of all, if this, the only aim, has not been attained, established order has been compromised; that strength has been weakened which, so long as it existed in public opinion, was immense, but when exposed to false and illegal attacks, and thus estimated at its real value, may have been trampled upon by that very power it intended to resist, and which dreaded it before they had come into an open contact.

In order that the question we have just proposed may be satisfactorily answered, let us look back to the events in Naples, in Spain, in Piedmont, and in Portugal. Although the revolution in Spain preceded that of Naples, we begin by the occurrence of the 5th of July, 1820.*

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* It is proper I should inform my readers, that I shall not say any thing of Sicily, preferring to make it the object of a separate note, since the events in that island have no connection with my general observations; and on that occasion I shall submit some reflections to the Count de Forbin, upon various chapters of his Travels in Sicily.

CHAPTER II

NAPLES.

Sect. I.

OF THE REVOLUTION IN NAPLES

If any thing can justify a nation that ostensibly assumes a state of insurrection, it is without doubt the weight of misery and servitude under which it groans. Unfeeling ministers may, in a kingdom in which the will of the ruler is absolute, prevent the cries of the people from reaching the monarch's ears; they may, by the abuse of their power, reduce men to a violent condition of despair; the public voice then makes itself heard, and the energy of calamity in a manner authorises the indignant murmurings which accompany the complaints

of grievance: but can this be said to have been the state of the kingdom of Naples, when a handful of soldiers excited its provinces into revolt for the obtaining of a constitution!

The stability of the law, and of finance, are two grand tests by which to ascertain the height of prosperity and tranquillity a nation can arrive at. There is no necessity for me to enter into any elaborate enquiries to prove, that before the event of the fifth of July, the kingdom of Naples was in the enjoyment of a secure guarantee of property, liberty of person, and public happiness.

The French code, the work of the most enlightened men of Europe, after having been introduced during the absence of King Ferdinand, was augmented by all the regulations which local interests required: the new laws had been discussed by a council of the *Chancellerie*, which had, in its decisions, rendered the judiciary power independent of the executive.

This legal system had spread its salutary

effects throughout the provinces by the distribution of the different courts of law. All classes of the people became assured of this paramount truth, that all men were equal in the eye of the law, and that the great land-holders and men who partook of public authority, could no longer, as heretofore, avail themselves of the influence of their situation or of their fortune. I might cite numerous examples in support of my assertion. But what more forcibly claims our notice than any other branch of the Neapolitan government, is the institution of the municipal bodies.

This foundation of a national representation, and first call for the suffrage of the small as well as the greater circles of society, was so admirably organised as to become a fit model and an example for other nations. France, although possessed of the sublime institutions of her charter, the immortal work of the first of her kings under whom the French have ever enjoyed political liberty, is in some degree

deficient in this valuable branch of the representative system, which we may designate as the leading constituent of public liberty. In that country, where there are no municipal institutions to guarantee the interests of the *communes*, there exists a kind of filial dependence upon the government, which ought at no time to exert its direct authority in the details of administration of the townships.

The civic councils of the kingdom of Naples were out of the reach of all influence of the supreme power: what does the greatest honour to the Chevalier de Médicis and the Marquis Tommasi, who more than others favoured the establishment of this system, is their having procured the approbation of a law, by which the council of each district, at the close of its sessions, may elect a representative to repair to government, and plead the interests of the *communes*.

The representatives commissioned to support the resolutions of these councils, were recog-

nised by his Majesty, and by the Ministers who gave them a hearing, with the consideration which their mission entitled them to with : government, which had already formed the wish to initiate a national representation in the exercise of power : this initiation is one of the most brilliant ideas of a ministry, which, previous to a change in the political position of the nation, designed to raise it to the level of that condition which it was shortly to enjoy. For such a condition cannot be instantly imparted as shall presume a perfect state of civilisation ; to arrive at this, it is essential to prepare each people, by institutions that effect a moral development proportioned to the great duties which they are destined to fulfil. Here we again encounter one of the absurd visions of the declaimers for political perfection : they imagine that every nation should resolve itself into a representative government, because, under such, the wishes of a nation are expressed and consulted on the imposition of taxes and

the framing of laws; because, under it, talent and merit soon make themselves known, are rightly appreciated, and encouraged; and because, under this form of government, one may freely express one's thoughts, speak, and cause others to speak as the organs of public opinion. But they forget that they thereby presuppose a great development of the human faculties, and great national morality; they forget that the duties which such a perfection in public affairs imposes, are rarely within the capacity of the great mass of mankind; and that a portion of the great European family is totally disabled from either comprehending or practising them. To demand a free constitution is not the only thing requisite; since under it individuals form a component part of the legislative power, and take also upon themselves the responsibility of all the good or ill that is done to society. It is necessary that all classes of the body politic, which acquire a right of intervention, should be well able to sustain the national

representation; and what is still more difficult, be able also to learn, and have a due respect for, the limits of their rights; for it is only by fallacious and illusive notions, such as are too often confided in, that men imagine they are superior to all subordination, and emancipated from all respect for the ruling power and from their duty as subjects, and thus cause the establishment of representative governments to be reckoned dangerous to social order, and menacing to established monarchies.

Ferdinand I. (IV.) found, on returning to his states, two great innovations; the domains sold; the remains of the feudal system entirely abolished, and along with it the entailed remainders and hereditary rights; the monastic fraternities extremely diminished, and their lands alienated for the use of the state, or by private sales.

The division of landed property had exceedingly enfeebled the chief families of the kingdom, had more generally allotted the riches of

the nation, and ought consequently to produce an effect more favourable to industry and civilisation: but that advantage could be brought about only by time, for, at first, all classes of society could not fail to experience thereby a disorganising blow. It becomes a considerable question whether the complete abolition of entailed heirships is fitting in a great monarchy. The example of England, the most industrious and the richest nation of the world, might decide the question in the negative; but at the same time it is not to be denied, that the sub-division of property is a very great advantage in a certain degree.

I say in a certain degree, for whatever assists the division of riches, takes away from those riches a sort of representation of them, which under monarchical governments, even although constitutional, answers equally as a bulwark against the abuse of power or illegal demands of the people; and if the owners of vast landed possessions, in the quality of an aristocratical

class, have sometimes exerted an undue influence, they have more frequently controlled arbitrary power, or stopped the inroads of anarchy.

During the late years of military occupation, all these novelties had prepared men's minds to require a form of government that should recompense them for the sacrifices they had made; but Murat had never been willing to consent to any other form than that which should place absolute authority in his hands. As an answer to the unceasing petitions that were presented on this head, a note of the Austrian minister was constantly shown, which positively refused to consent to any proposition tending to the introduction of a constitution: nevertheless, a few days before his quitting the kingdom, Murat signed his consent to a demand made by the nobility and the principal classes, which had for object a representative constitution; this became, at such a moment, a tardy, futile, and ridiculous expedient.

The ministers of King Ferdinand were not ignorant of this concession, but as his Majesty owed his return to the Austrian forces, he was constrained to sign a treaty with the emperor of Austria, by which he engaged that he would make no political innovation in his states without the sanction of the Austrian government.

I offer no observations upon that treaty; I am aware that such stipulations might be considered to be contrary to the liberty of nations, and not to be binding, because it is never proper to stipulate in contravention to the political independence of a state: but I demand merely (without approving of the principle) whether the ministers of the king of Naples could oppose the will of this great power, at a moment when Austrian bayonets had expelled Murat, to restore the kingdom to its legitimate dynasty? Time, and the course of events, might have induced the king to exonerate himself from all obligation under such an engagement; but it was wrong to cement the authority of the

stronger power, and such was the infallible consequence. Above all, it was improper to counteract rashly the policy of a protecting power, which would, in consequence, have a right to complain, and to resist such an infraction of the treaty.

The state of the kingdom of Naples, and the principles which gave the population a new political character, did not escape the observation of the ministry; and far from opposing or paralysing the tendency to a general amelioration, the Chevalier de Médicis and his colleagues advised the king to foster and to second it. Ferdinand I. and his government thus became objects of admiration with all Europe. The king watched over the preservation of the ancient laws, he would not permit of the slightest alteration of them, nor of a single arbitrary act. Public credit rose in an instant, and the treasury, supported by opinion, was soon put into a condition to pay not only the debts of the last war, and the obligations entered into with Aus-

tria, but also to cancel the securities of the ministers of the other powers, and of Prince Eugene.

In 1820 the public debts were paid, and the internal administration proceeded according to the new form of the division into districts. A fund for liquidations was established. The arts were encouraged; the public buildings attested the opulence of the nation, and the activity of the government: peace was concluded with the Barbary powers, and the abolition of slavery stipulated for by treaty. The army was nearly organised, and was commanded by officers of merit, who had acquired experience in the German, Spanish, and Russian campaigns.

The two grand objects of civilisation and the increase of political knowledge, liberty and equal rights, were favoured by the public institutions. Every person who through his talent, his acquisitions, or his valour, had any right to have his merit estimated, might

claim the consideration of the government, and was sure of obtaining a place: the table of the persons in active employment proves the truth of what I have asserted.

With regard to public liberty, the laws, the independence of Courts of Justice, and the organisation of the municipal system, the council of *Chancellerie* formed the guarantee of their security, and furnished a hope of their more complete establishment, in due proportion to the degree of civilisation which the Neapolitan people possessed.

Whence then could the discontent have possibly arisen, which called for the revolution of the month of July? How far was it well founded, and how widely partaken of? Such are the points which remain for us to examine. It is distressing to be obliged to look back to the errors of a people, and it would be a far greater consolation to have to speak only of its glory and its prosperity!

Sect. II.

ON THE CAUSES OF THE REVOLUTION IN NAPLES

Much has been said respecting secret sects; and to that of the *Carbonari* the revolutions in Naples and in Piedmont have been generally attributed. Without exaggerating the influence of these meetings, still I imagine that there was an endeavour to turn them into opportunities of assembling, to spread with greater facility the language of discontent, and to cajole the ambition of democrats; but I am not at all inclined to believe that it is to such unions that the revolution of Naples or those of the other states is exclusively due.

In Italy, the sect of the *Carbonari*, like so many others, had been encouraged at a certain epoch by foreign governments, and particularly by England, as an efficacious means of

attacking the kings whom Napoleon had established. The powers that desired to replace the legitimate monarchs upon their thrones, made use of them as a species of occult crusade, supported by the general wish, and comprising a formidable party opposed to the chiefs of the French rule.

For the sake of imparting to every class that hatred in which those were held whom it was wished to overthrow, it became necessary to assert the maxims of liberty and independence, to describe the absolute power of the ruling authorities as an insupportable oppression; and these societies were resorted to for inviting the people to a political emancipation: the measure met with success.

A short time previous to the downfal of Murat and Napoleon, these clubs entered into a correspondence with the agents of the foreign powers; but an expectation was entertained, that as soon as the present object was effected, the influence and action of the societies would

cease. It was not recollected that, by accustoming the various classes of the people to meet together, and to debate respecting their independence, men were thereby brought to reason with regard to rights, in which they would afterwards naturally wish to participate. So that the legitimate kings were no sooner seated upon their thrones, than their people, believing they had greatly assisted in their return, continued, by means of these associations, to frame projects of reform.

In passing from under one government to another, there is always a class of persons who find their former influence diminished, and who, having been displaced, along with their first masters, remain in a state of discontent, so that they wish for some new change, that their actual position may become thereby in some degree neutralized. It was highly probable that the instigators of a plan of reform would be discovered to belong to this class; those, however, who are well acquainted with

the events of July, know that not one of the principal personages under the military occupation of Murat, took the lead in these political troubles.

They have been looked upon as *Carbonari*, because words are, unfortunately, no less misdirected than actions; and in the language of persons of exaggerated ideas, every Italian is a Carbonaro. This word, which is pronounced with too little reflection, is become one of proscription in the mouth of those who, losing sight of their own conduct, think, that by insulting others they shelter themselves from all reproach. At Naples, generally speaking, the characters most distinguished, whether by their fortune, their talents, or their rank, have never mixed in those associations; and if they had any grievances to complain of, they represented them to the government, but abstained from conspiring. At the commencement of 1820, the Neapolitans were no less a peaceable than a happy people.

I have already stated, that in the latter days of the government which preceded that of Ferdinand I. a charter had been repeatedly demanded, and was granted in the last emergency; a concession truly ridiculous, from which there could be derived no practical utility.

Many towns in the kingdom of Naples maintained the same pretensions after Murat's downfal; but when it was found that the government of Ferdinand guaranteed public credit and the personal security of individuals, and that the administration was incessantly bent upon reforms of a nature conducive to the general welfare, public expectation looked forward to a future government more in unison with the wishes of a part of the nation, and all appeared satisfied with their present condition.

An unfortunate occurrence, for which there was no remedy, created at this time some agitation throughout the provinces. The low

price of provisions, and of corn in particular, had for the last three years occasioned discontent amongst the landed proprietors. Instead of endeavouring to ascertain the cause of this evil, and to trace its origin in the very extended commerce carried on with the various parts of Asia Minor, from whence, after the general peace, the overflowing produce of the Levant was brought to the shores of the Mediterranean, the fault was laid upon government, and upon the excessive rate of taxation.

The contributions, since the king's return, had never exceeded what was levied in the time of Murat; and the government found itself with no other revenue for meeting the payment of twenty-five millions to Austria, for maintaining the troops of that power, and for fulfilling the obligations incurred with foreign ministers, and with Prince Eugene.

The troops were certainly less numerous than during the military occupation; and the Chevalier de Médicis intended, as soon as

the public debt should be liquidated, to submit to his Majesty a plan of contributions analagous to the wants of the state, and to the resources of the nation.

It must be considered that, until the year 1815, eighteen millions of ducats had been levied yearly, although no external commerce whatever could be carried on, owing to the blockade of the kingdom of Naples by British cruizers; so that property and industry had, during ten years, been shut out from the resources of exportation, and greater difficulties had existed in the payment of taxes.

Upon the return of the king, the influx of foreign shipping, and the exchange of the commodities of various countries, rendered trade so much more flourishing, that it extended the greatest advantage to agriculture and industry. Notwithstanding this, the spirit of discontent, occasioned by the low price of provisions, served as a pretext to some persons for claiming the establishment

of institutions more analogous to their wishes than the existing ones. Although it has been proved by experience, that less revenues are derived from a nation by absolute governments, than by those of a representative form, there are no surer means of leading the mass of the people astray than the bait of a financial reform. Anonymous letters were addressed to ministers; a language of insubordination was heard in every fair and market-town.

An Austrian general had entered the service of the king of Naples; he had re-organised the army, and had been appointed commander-in-chief. The mildness of his manners, his engaging deportment towards the generals and other officers employed, made him endeavour to soften every misunderstanding that might arise between those who had served during the king's absence, and those who had retired to Sicily; but being a foreigner, that circumstance, connected with his elevation, gave universal dissatisfaction.

These are, perhaps, the only symptoms of discontent that could be observed; and they were nearly effaced by the consideration which the government so deservedly enjoyed. It was very difficult, even for those persons who meditated innovations, to lay hold of any pretence that would give a colouring for breaking out into insurrection.

A general discontent, when founded in reason, and arising out of the injuries inflicted by an abuse of power, will break out amongst all classes of a nation: but it is not for an armed force to take the lead in venting that discontent; it ought not to be evinced by the military, who can never be the proper organ for expressing it. When, therefore, it was announced, on July 2nd, that a few soldiers had deserted under the conduct of a lieutenant and of some officers, in order to give the signal for rebellion, the inhabitants of Naples remained perfectly quiet, and thunderstruck at so unexpected an event. The desertion of these men, whose example was

followed by some battalions from various corps, might have extended no further, if those regiments that were ready to obey the orders of their commanders, had been employed to quell it on its first breaking out. But I abstain from giving my opinion upon this extraordinary event. I must, however, do justice to the honourable conduct of three individuals, the Duke de Roccaromana, Prince de Cariati, and Count Statella. These general officers were no sooner appointed to disperse the men who had given the signal for revolt, than they urged the necessity of falling at once upon the handful of soldiers, who were embarrassed with the part they had begun to act; but this zeal was forced to give way to the orders of their commander-in-chief. A disposition so pacific, afforded time for the insurgents to procure reinforcements, and conveyed to the army an impression that the rising had taken place in conformity with the general will. Irresolution was now construed into a kind of encouragement, which prompted

the desertion of the whole army; and when joined by some peasants from the provinces, they mustered, in all, from fifteen to twenty thousand.

It requires but a moment to produce great events, or to arrest their progress; and severe reflections will, however, certainly attend those who suffer that moment to escape when they have had it within their grasp. The course of things, however, will not be retarded by their regrets.

Let us stop here to inquire what attitude was assumed by the factious, who called upon the supreme power for a new form of government. Let us suppose them to have been the organ of the general will.

When the king heard that they wanted a constitution, he sent for answer, that he would grant it in the course of eight days. This was already allowing too much: by such an answer the sovereign authority was sanctioning an affinity between the demand of the insurgents and its own will.

Had the change, so promised by the king, been patiently expected, there would have been established, as it were, a connection between the right on the part of the nation to urge its claim, and the right on the part of the sovereign to grant or to reject it.

A communication so established, would have corresponded with the public wishes; and if the right of petition had not been transgressed, the royal authority would have been respected, the submission due to the crown acknowledged, and the monarch's free consent would have given sanction to every thing.

So far, however, from being satisfied with the king's reply, the leaders of this wavering mass of people, unable to restrain their demands within proper limits, no sooner found themselves freed from the apprehension of actual resistance, than, unmindful of the moral force of public opinion, or of well regulated order, regardless of the consequences of overthrowing established powers, and inattentive

to the merits of their pretensions, or to the means of enforcing them, they determined to set at nought the will of the monarch; and, as if the great political institutions of a country could be changed with the same facility as the sentences in a speech, or the scheme of an individual, as if laws framed at the moment, like the stanzas of a poetical canto, were calculated to guarantee the fate of a nation and, the happiness of a people, the constitution of the Spanish Cortes was presented to the king, and he was compelled to accept it!

Sect. III.

OF THE COURSE THAT WAS FOLLOWED IN THE EARLY IMPULSE OF THE REVOLUTION.

Let us now return to our subject, and consider whether those persons who constituted themselves the representatives of five millions of inhabitants, have justified by their conduct their self-assumed mission; and whether, acting

as they have done, they have upheld and secured the national interests: for every political action, in order to bear a semblance of justice, and to be taken for the expression of the general will, must rest upon the basis of public welfare.

What were the means resorted to by those who appeared eager for a change and for a constitutional order of things? They employed a military force, they framed a constitution at the moment, and laid aside the authority of the sovereign.

Can the attempt to obtain a political reform bear any other stamp of its legality, than what is derived from its being the expression of the general will? This will not admit of a doubt. I ask, therefore, whether the military can ever be the organ of that will? If they are intended to support the executive power, if they are paid to obey simply the orders emanating from this power, and are not allowed either to judge for themselves, or to analyse events, they can have no interest in common with the other

classes of society; for the single reason, that their duty is one of blindfold obedience. As even their reasoning faculties are denied to them, their position differs in every respect from that of landed proprietors, and of all other classes of the community. When, therefore, the army is resorted to, the germ of corruption and of indiscipline is spread in its ranks, by employing it to support a will, which, if of general assent, stands in need of no other power than that of being properly directed; and which, when not general, can effect nothing beyond an insurrection, as disorderly as it is illegal; and consequently can be productive of no advantage, and can prescribe no duty.

The employment of the military for expressing the public will, is to fail in the object which has been contemplated. The soldiery are but a fictitious force, in whose hands would thus be placed a false, or rather, a dangerous power; for so far from being the protectors of public liberty, they would hold it at their command. As the army is a body quite distinct

and apart from every other class, the selection of that body as the organ through which the interests of the people shall be demanded of the sovereign, whom it is bound to obey, is but proclaiming a despotic authority, which, freed from all obstacles, will invade every power, and break through every restraint. To employ it as the representative of the general will, is but placing that will at its mercy, whenever the army shall think proper to crush it. History furnishes us with numberless precedents that will exhibit proofs of this great truth. That course is therefore not only illegal and dangerous, but opposed to the intended object; for no demand ought to be attended to, unless it be presented by the true organs of public opinion. We shall return again to this subject.

Was the forming a constitution in a moment, and presenting that of the Spanish Cortes, a more prudent or more legitimate proceeding than the first course which was resorted to,

with the view of having that constitution proclaimed?

A change in the political order of a nation, ought assuredly not to be effected by soldiers or the peasantry, without the concurrence of the heads of that nation, and of the men who are best acquainted with the moral condition of their country. It is not in an open camp, composed of from ten to twenty thousand men hurrying down from the villages and provinces, that the laws most adapted to a state can be organised and fixed upon. What can be more ridiculous or absurd, than so inconsiderate, so arbitrary an act, which causes a political charter to be proclaimed by a few priests and a handful of soldiers, when upwards of three-fourths of the nation are ignorant of what is demanded in its name, and what it is compelled to acknowledge? Might it not have been expected that statesmen, judges, financiers, enlightened men, literary characters, great landed proprietors, all those in short who have

an interest in the fate of the nation, would have been consulted, before a legal character could be given to the claims and demands submitted to the sovereign authority?

Let us inquire whether the Spanish constitution embraced all the conditions that were requisite, in order to secure the public interests, and the respect due to the crown.

The Spanish constitution, framed at a time when the legitimate power had, from its position, been reduced to little more than an ideal one, when the great landed proprietors were either dispersed, or found to be in the ranks of the new government, for whose overthrow the contest was carried on, was deficient in the two conditions most essential for enabling it to maintain the balance of powers.

The monarch might be looked upon as the first magistrate, from the external representation with which he was surrounded, but not from the rights which he was left to enjoy. Divested of all authority, he could not have

the energy, that is derived from the independence of real power.

Property had not a shadow of representation; the constitution of Spain had been framed without any attention to the inequalities existing in property, and appeared to take for granted a community of goods, as if the feudal system, or substitutions of property, were not known in that country; as if the nation had consisted of no other ranks than merchants, artisans, or the lower classes; as if the state contained no other public bodies besides the one whose only interest depended, not upon preserving, but upon destroying. How then could it be imagined that the wishes of a whole nation were attended to by demanding a political change, which did not in any way contemplate the interests of landed proprietors, of administrative bodies, or of existing authorities?

By compelling the king to abdicate his authority, independent of the overthrowing of established order, and of the monarchical prin

ciple, or of the violent means that were resorted to, could it be supposed that the new form of government would be assented to by the many who are attached to hereditary power and to all its rights—an attachment which foreboded their own ruin? Was it not perceived that, deprived of all support, the resignation appeared compulsory?

What stability, therefore, what guarantee could be offered by an act which could neither be acquiesced in by the crown nor by the landed proprietors, and which would naturally spread the alarm amongst the princes who governed the rest of Italy?

During the first campaigns of General Bonaparte, Upper Italy was organised under a representative, but, at the same time, a republican form of government: the different corporations enjoyed an elective franchise, and Lombardy filled the entire peninsula with the fame of *The Cisalpine Republic*. This name was dear to the Italians, as it recalled to them their

ancient greatness and independence. Such is, however, the destiny of states, whose political existence is abridged, and vanishes like the existence of man, and which the irrevocable decrees of fate place in a widely different condition from that in which history presents it to us. The institutions of General Bonaparte had disappeared under the imperial dynasty of Napoleon, but they had left the germ of national independence; and although it cannot be doubted that this germ was feeble, it contributed nevertheless to the overthrow of the viceroyalty. These ideas began to acquire a certain moral power when the Austrian government had returned. Thus it was natural for the house of Austria to apprehend, as to these states, very serious consequences from the Neapolitan revolution, which, in disturbing the established authorities, would furnish the example of a violent change.

This view of the circumstance could not fail to excite consideration, when, unfortunately, the Neapolitans prepared to maintain, by force

of arms, a constitution that savoured of democracy, whilst, if they had but waited for eight days, as the king demanded, they would most assuredly have obtained a reform, or a constitution, granted with the free will of the monarch. They would also have furnished the example of that respect which is due to the supreme authority, and have calmed all agitation of the other governments respecting any danger that could possibly extend to them: but such forecast was not to be expected in men, who, far from being real representatives of the nation, were merely, if I may use the expression, the jugglers of its general will, and who, without consulting the moral power of opinion, and the public interests, imagined they might dictate any laws they thought fit, under the sole condition of a blind submission to their commands, and with no other purpose but the destruction of the national establishments.

In this state of the affair, could there be a hope, that foreign governments would consent to recognise a revolutionary event of the sort?

There were but two means to obtain the toleration of it (means which yet could not afford it any justification); one of these was to triumph by strength of arms over all opposition, the other to submit to the free wishes of the monarch.

It would have been ridiculous to suppose even a possibility of employing the first: an opportunity presented itself of accepting the second of these means, but the advantage of seizing *it* was not comprehended, and what is almost incredible of belief, it was rejected and contemned.

Sect. IV.

WHY THE NEAPOLITANS HAVE LOST EVERY THING.

THE event which we now proceed to speak of, will demonstrate why the several people, or those who desired to represent them, have been unable to obtain the object of their demands.

or to preserve what they had obtained for a moment by their revolt.

Two occasions presented themselves, on which to repair the faults committed since the 5th of July, 1820. The first was an advance made by a foreign power, announcing that she was not disinclined to offer herself as mediatrix, as soon as she could be assured, that some important changes in the constitution adopted, would be consented to.

The hope of creating this protection, which was so essential, was no sooner communicated by the B—— C——, than the ministers, who saw all the danger and difficulty of the actual state of things, hastened to take hold of it, as the means of exonerating the nation from whatever blame had been imputed to it. The M——— was charged to communicate the intentions of the ministry to the president of the Neapolitan Cortes, and also to two other members who had the greatest influence. He flattered himself that he was the harbinger of the

most encouraging and satisfactory communication, under the difficulties of the national situation; and he was persuaded that the situation of their affairs was thoroughly understood, and was felt by the Cortes; in the number of whom were to be reckoned men highly distinguished by their understanding.

But what was his astonishment, when he only obtained, after a protracted negociation, a determined refusal; and found it impossible for him to make the president comprehend that the proposed mediation was the sole means of saving the kingdom from the dangers with which it was threatened, and the only reliance for safety, which it was prudent speedily to resort to, if they wished to weather an inevitable and increasing tempest. On the other hand, language and argument, worthy of the Roman senate in the epoch of its greatest power, was made use of; to support which, the Cortes spoke of the will of the nation they represented, whose mandates they could not

revoke: just as if they had been elected to deliver the nation up to all the calamities of which it has become the victim.

At the same moment that these representatives were asserting they had no function to perform, but that of supporting the constitution set up by a few soldiers and countrymen, the king's ministers received the most positive assurances from every province of the kingdom, that they demanded only a reform more agreeable to the king's own wishes, to their interests, and to the political position of the kingdom. Thus, whilst men were designating themselves as the interpreters of the will of a nation, that nation proclaimed a totally different sentiment, as if it wished to abjure the errors of those who had become the arbiters of its destiny.

The second occasion that offered to the Cortes, was when his Majesty, before he set out to meet the sovereigns, according to their invitation, after having assembled the diplomatic

corps, in the presence of the ministers of the different powers, dictated to his royal son, the Duke of Calabria, the preliminary articles of a charter, which he had resolved to give to his people of his free accord. This was the only mode of giving a plausible colour to the events which had previously caused him to sign what of his free will he would always have rejected. This voluntary act of King Ferdinand must have been the more solemn, as it had for its witnesses the representatives of the foreign potentates, who, although they appeared at it neither by way of approbation or of disapprobation, could not fail, however, thence to evidence to Europe the free manifestation of the king's own wish; and they could never refuse to furnish their attestation of it. Their only contrary sentiment could never exceed an expression of regret at their having assisted at the convocation.

The articles of the constitution dictated by his Majesty, were in a great portion those of

the French charter. This declaration, which could not only save the nation, and efface the recollection of its excesses, but was besides a monument of the king's generosity, was signed by the king and by the minister of foreign affairs, and presented to the Cortes. There was every reliance upon the fullest expression of joy and gratitude—it was expected that blessings would be ejaculated for this happy conception, as an act of redemption offered at a moment of the greatest peril; and hopes were entertained of at length seeing this new code of public felicity accepted with enthusiasm, and with a sentiment of the advantages of which it was the promise. But the Cortes rejected also this salutary boon, offered by a monarch, who at that moment proved himself to be truly the father of his subjects, in preserving them from the evils which awaited them: they refused to admit of any change in that ill-fated constitution, which was so soon to resemble Pandora's box, divested of the flattery of hope.

They thus missed, once more, the only means of realising the expectation and wishes of the nation, and after having revolted against good order, they ended by revolting against good sense.

As, in every case of a government established by surprisal, distrust is the distinguishing character of those who enjoy a momentary power; the ministry were accused, and displaced—several idols of the day were overturned on the morrow—those who spoke with moderation were looked upon to be traitors—those who were prudent and rational became guilty in the estimation of men blinded by their passions. Exaggerated principles had pushed reason and wisdom to one side, and the public mind was become bewildered.

All the world is acquainted with the result of such inconceivable conduct, and all the world must be still astounded by it. Until then no power had pretended to possess a right of meddling with the internal changes of a nation,

no former example furnished any precedent of such right; and doubtless, but for the insensate and absurd conduct of the Neapolitan Cortes, Europe would not have been the spectatress of so important an innovation upon the rights of mankind and the policy of states, as that of beholding a foreign armament employed to regulate the internal institutions of nations. The Cortes, and the authors of the revolution, far from preventing the establishment of this example, which went to change every recognised principle, entailed it unavoidably! They pretended that a people should be free and independent in the government of its country, and they have met with redoubled dependence upon foreign power;—they wished to emancipate themselves from an authority, which, far from being absolute, was an example of moderation and of respect for the laws, and they have been forced to submit to a severe government;—they refused the offers of a friendly power, the generous grant of the

monarch, and at the time they thought they were endowed with strength, they found themselves feeble and helpless.

Another fault, which may be termed almost irreparable, by the future consequences it must produce, is the having committed the touchstone of public opinion by presenting it in a false light. When this opinion could influence by its genuine sway, it was extremely powerful —it was consulted by kings and their ministers —it was a leading impulse in the decisions of the government, because it addressed itself to their reason and to their consistency; because its argument was humanity and justice: but so soon as it was put into action on a partial and defective scale, so soon as its name was usurped to awaken evil passions, it was presented on its weak side, and the noble influence it possessed over every authority was at once destroyed. An irreparable error!—an exhaustless source of the most dreadful consequences!

CHAPTER III.

OF THE PIEDMONTESE REVOLUTION.

One is induced to believe, that the over eager design of a political change puffs up the intellect of the prime agitators in so inordinate a degree, in their visions of reform, that they forget not only themselves, but the real state of their country: as if the simple promulgation of the Spanish constitution could, like the club of Hercules, vanquish every obstacle, or beat down all enemies. The Piedmontese looked without the smallest anxiety at the approach of the Austrian army to their soil, and at their generals being immediately occupied in forming a junction of all their forces, to put a stop to the Piedmontese revolution,

before they should make an attack upon that of Naples. The event that had happened in Piedmont was not merely a question of principle for the House of Austria; it was one that could not be thought foreign to her states, from the people of Lombardy having become disposed to a similar rising. Nothing but a general insurrection throughout all the Peninsula could by any possibility save Piedmont; but had the Piedmontese any just right to flatter themselves that an universal cry would be raised in the whole of Italy, for the purpose of approving or of seconding the step they had taken, and to arrest and paralyze the Austrian troops?

Let us endeavour to ascertain what was the true condition of Italy at that time, that we may preserve our minds from all the illusion which the name of this enchanting country produces in poetical imaginations. Could it be thought with sincerity that there was a greater possibility in Italy than elsewhere, of

establishing a central representative government? I most decidedly think the contrary. In Italy, two states claim our consideration, which, by their political organisation, as it now exists, and as it has existed these eleven years, do not desire to change the condition in which they are now placed. I speak of the Roman States and of Tuscany. Those two countries may, in point of fact, be reckoned two of the most independent upon the Continent. What traveller is there, who, if he has but resided at Rome, has not admired the liberty enjoyed by every one there, and the political and individual security of that city? All who are not tolerated by the other governments of the Continent, all who are molested, menaced, proscribed, find a sure refuge in the capital of the Christian world: there hatred smooths its brow, persecution stays its hand, party disappears, and enmities cease; dethroned kings, abdicated princes, disgraced ministers, and unfortunate men, meet at Rome, with an echo to their sigh

of retrospection, with a due regard for their historical existence, and with a shelter in their misfortune. It is the true temple of Janus, shut for the advantage of mankind. Who is there that dares persecute a man who has come to seek refuge in the bosom of the maternal city of our religion! Rome would appear never to lay aside her great protection; and the supreme authority, to which all the states of Europe come to offer a respectful homage, has only removed its site in quitting the steps of the Capitol to reside within the sill of the Vatican.

In the government of his Holiness, the word absolute power has not an existence: order and tranquillity alone make it clear that all live under a gentle and easy law. Therefore, I ask, could the Romans have an interest in changing their tranquillity, their repose, and their real liberty, against the mischances of any form of government which should resolve Rome into a constituent territory of an union?

Rome, which, when a republic, would never permit a republican to exist elsewhere! This situation, which commands so much respect for the Romans, renders their capital a sort of political sanctuary, and will rarely induce them to take a part in the insurrections of other provinces of Italy, having legislative reforms for their object.

The Tuscans live under a paternal government; their prince rules over his subjects as a father over his children.* Florence enjoys every liberty that is compatible with social order. No person is restrained from freely

* The news of the grand duke's death had not arrived when these observations were written. The loss of this excellent prince will be keenly felt by the Tuscans: he was well entitled to the love of his subjects and to the admiration of foreigners. The path of his successor has been marked out by so fine a model; but were it even possible for him not to follow it, the happiness of the Tuscans is already secured to them by the laws of Leopold, the true father of his people.

expressing his opinions by the dread of endangering his personal safety. There is no obstruction to the encouragement of public instruction. Proscriptions, or arrestations for matters of opinion are never heard of; whosoever has had to complain of the police of other countries, can have no cause to be otherwise than satisfied with that of Tuscany. Under such a government, the Florentines may pass their time singing on the banks of the Arno, dreaming of the happy age of the Pitti and the Medici, yielding to the softest recollections, which they are sure no regrets will ever embitter. This political position renders the Tuscans indifferent to that of other people; and it was easy to foresee that they would never join in the desire to alter their condition, or to assume a state of insurrection.

At the time when a political movement of the people of Italy against the generals of France had been encouraged, Rome and Tuscany were in a very different position; both

had been plundered of the master-pieces of Italian genius. The monuments which attested the age of Julius II., of Leo X., of Lorenzo de Medicis, &c. had disappeared. Rome and Florence had become petty provinces of the great French empire. That power of genius which commands the admiration of all countries, and attracted foreign artists, and the greatest men of civilised nations to the banks of the Arno and the Tiber, had been compelled to give way, and to unite itself with the military laurels which are sometimes found to stain the laurels of the Muses with blood. The crowns of Parnassus that form so brilliant a train to the pride of talents, had all been carried away to the Louvre. The fine arts no longer reigned in the Pitti palace nor in the Vatican: the Tuscans were groaning under an oppression of taxes; all public situations were filled by foreigners: it was natural, then, that the Romans and the Tuscans should desire to establish themselves into independent nations; and if the Piedmon-

tese and Neapolitans had attempted at that time what they afterwards did so imprudently at an unseasonable moment, and with quite a different object in view, their conduct would, no doubt, have received the approbation and support of the whole of Italy. It would seem, however, that revolutions have been operated in the Italian states by piecemeal, just in the same manner as their country has been torn into several portions.

In Italy, as elsewhere, only one opportunity of success had presented itself for notions of general independence; this was, when kings and their people had a common interest in overthrowing the power of the French ruler. That moment had no sooner gone by, than old customs returned into their former state; and if princes found they had a new people to govern, the people discovered no change in those princes. Those, therefore, who cherished the same affection for them, no longer dreamt of innovations; and it could not be a matter of surprise to such

as felt otherwise, that the governments should be prepared to watch, and to counteract any attempt at a change.

Before the revolution of March, 1821, was set about, the Piedmontese ought at least to have made themselves well acquainted with the condition of the Peninsula; they ought to have known that they could not reckon upon any assistance from the Neapolitans. For, supposing the Neapolitans capable of making a powerful defence, all means of contact with them were rendered impossible by the intervening countries of Tuscany and the Roman States, and by the Austrian army. Their only hope, therefore, must have rested upon Lombardy: but it required early success on the part of the Piedmontese, before Lombardy could declare itself, surrounded as it was by Austrian troops; and, indeed, with the exception of a certain class of people, no great dependance was to be placed upon the Lombards for seconding so decided an enthusiasm in a cause which was

not much suited to the lower ranks of the community. For the want of attachment to a government, or a state of political apathy, are no proofs of any want of a change. These considerations might well have escaped the Neapolitans, whose position enabled them to separate their cause from that of other states in Italy; but it was of paramount necessity for the Piedmontese, that they should sound the intentions, and ascertain the resources of the remaining part of the Peninsula.

These reflections ought, however, to have occurred, as soon as an unity of will had been secured in all the states of the King of Sardinia that were intended to second, or to acknowledge the revolutionary impulse. What certainty did there exist that the inhabitants of Savoy were disposed to adopt the principles of the reform which had been proclaimed? The event of the first days has proved the contrary, even with respect to the Piedmontese: their revolution might be called a private act, since

the public had hardly any share in it. Now, I ask, whether it was proper to bring the political order of a state into compromise, and to endanger the safety and character of the most distinguished individuals, without first considering the condition in which the country stood at the time when the insurrection at Turin was openly avowed? „It cannot be answered here, that a great attempt must be undertaken with boldness, and that the whole mass of the population are sure to concur in it after its first success. Europe of 1814 was no longer to be found in Europe of 1821. The temper of certain speeches pronounced in the French Chamber of Deputies; a slight agitation in a part of Germany; symptoms of reasoning discovered in some military corps belonging to the northern powers; the complete nonentity of the prisoner of St. Helena—had operated an entire change in the political object of the cabinets of Europe. And since the Treaty of Paris, the sovereigns had, year after year, exchanged

fresh pledges of their determination no longer to attend to individual pretentions, to personal aggrandisement, or to the acquisition of territory; well convinced, that to remain in peace, and to govern their subjects disposed to obedience, were far more desirable objects than to reign over more extended countries, which might be convulsed by political agitation. They had, therefore, advantageously placed their forces, in order to keep watch, or rather as sentinels over the thoughts of the multitude. In this state of things it ought to have been evident to all, that any alarm occasioned to the heads of nations would be met by corresponding opposition and resistance; and no people could have been so struck with this picture as the Piedmontese, in respect of whom the Austrians stood as the vanguard of those nations.

To that beautiful but unfortunate chimera, of seeing Italy united in one great family, are to be attributed those dreams which occasionally endanger the repose of the finest country in

the world; where the sound of liberty has oftener, perhaps, been heard than in any other country, but where real liberty has never been but an illusion. Always parcelled out, divided in interests, in power, in ambition, and in will, the States of this Peninsula, which has contested, in all ages, the right of placing itself pre-eminently forward in history, could at no time be united or agreed respecting their condition or their mutual pretentions. In the earliest days of modern Europe, when all might have been Italians, they preferred being Bavarians, French, Austrians, or Spaniards, and were unable to join in one common bond the true interests of national independence. And as for the republics, they seldom were otherwise than irreconcileable enemies, and often, to gratify their revenge, would call in the assistance of a foreign power. Under Napoleon these differences had begun to melt away, and there was a distant prospect of centralising a national sentiment; this political fusion was, however,

not only incomplete and defective, but he had brought it about in his own way, and by means that were quite incompatible with that notion of independence and of liberty which the Italians had so fondly entertained.

Italy being nearly restored to its former state, what prince could declare himself the sovereign of this Peninsula without crushing the power of other princes who participated in its sovereignty? It is unhappily reserved to a conqueror alone to amalgamate a multitude of states into one kingdom. The liberty of a divided people can only be partial in its nature.

The Piedmontese revolution has been so speedily brought to a close, that we need only repeat here what we have already stated, of the little confidence that can be reposed in the military when it is sought to express the general will of a nation:—and this was certainly not the case in Piedmont.

The Piedmontese troops at one time obeyed the chiefs who revolted, and demanded a con-

stitution; at another time they followed a general who, instead of marching to fight the enemy, hurried on to reinforce him, under the impression that the most unfortunate results would attend the insurrection of his country. Thus, the very army which was relied upon for resisting the Austrian troops, was made an instrument for arresting the progress of a revolt, which, in the first moment it had encouraged, or perhaps instigated.

This will prove that recourse should never be had to a military insurrection, in order to convey to the supreme power the expression of the general will. On such an occasion, the military ought rather to be regarded as an enemy, or as *perfect* strangers. But there never will be found any hostility in the army, when, in urgent distresses, complaints are lawfully expressed, so that the reforms may emanate from the monarch, and when the sovereign authority is not threatened, its existence endangered, nor established order overthrown.

CHAPTER IV.

OF SPAIN PREVIOUSLY TO 1814—CONSTITUTION OF 1812—ITS ABOLITION.

SPAIN had framed a constitution at a time when her king was a prisoner at Valençay, her existing authorities dissolved, her laws suspended, the landed proprietors dispersed—having fled to foreign countries, while others were to be found in the ranks of Joseph Bonaparte,—and when no respect was paid either to property or authority of any kind.

Spain was in a state of war, and invaded by French troops; the entire nation was eager to shake off a foreign yoke. This sentiment prevailed all over the Peninsula; it became a matter of necessity with all, and operated a revolution in the moral attitude of the nation.

The idea of independence, the only one that pervaded all minds, was sufficient to create an extraordinary change in the mass of the people; for whenever this notion becomes general, enthusiasm must follow. But a form of government was required in order to give a direction to this spirit of independence; it was indispensible that the people should listen to the language of liberty and of duty. Several distinct regencies were now observed to succeed each other, the interests of which were found to be quite contradictory; the Cortes were called together with the view of giving to the government one common centre.

The Cortes, when they proclaimed the basis of a representative system, made an attack upon two powerful interests, the religious corporations, and the noble, or landed proprietors: their object was to turn in a moment, and, as it were, by enchantment, from the most strictly feudal and theocratical government, to a state of republicanism only adapted to a

society in its infancy, and nearly isolated or to an union of a hundred thousand virtuous and enlightened men. No country was less adapted to that form of government; it took for granted the possibility of a sudden change in the habits and prejudices of a people trained to a state of dependance, but a dependance at once proud and hierarchical in its nature.

Whilst matters remained in suspense, and so long as the priests and nobles had a common interest in the general independence, the laws of the Cortes, so far from encountering any opposition, received the approbation of all those who remained with the government, or perhaps it will be more correct to state, of all those who resided at Cadiz; for the constitution of 1812 could not be made known to the entire nation, which was at this time in a state of organised insurrection. The religious corporations had not resisted those new laws, being far more apprehensive of the regulations of foreigners, which would destroy all the in-

fluence of the priesthood, than of resigning a portion of temporal power in their own country, where they were certain of always exercising an undoubted control over the habits of the people. The king's return arrested the progress of this new constitution, or rather destroyed it. The great landed proprietors, and the religious corporations took advantage of this event, and what should have been only modified, was destroyed by their advice.

Sect. I.

CONDUCT OF THE DISAFFECTED.

It is not my intention to revert to the time when Ferdinand returned to his dominions. The revolution of 1820 would probably have been avoided, had his Majesty's ministers pointed out to him that Spain had experienced, during five years, a great political convulsion, and that the public mind had consequently taken a new direction. They might have re-

presented that the Spanish nation had felt its own dignity, and become conscious of its power when fighting for its independence and for the freedom of its king. A reward was to be expected for the great sacrifices it had made, and some reform might have been adopted, since the Spaniards had rendered themselves worthy of every consideration. I will refrain from discussing what might have been done, but will confine myself to an analysis of facts.

It cannot be doubted that discontent was created by the conduct of the government on the king's return. Some few persons by whom the throne was surrounded, instead of recognising in the successes of the Spaniards the free effort of a generous people, who could defend their own liberty and the legitimacy of the crown, perhaps characterised as rebels the defenders of their country. This imputation, which might have been directed to the promoters of the event of 1820, did not apply to those who defended the independence proclaimed in 1812.

Hard treatment, proscriptions, executions, became the order of the day; the national feeling was silenced; the restoration of the ancient political order spread general dismay, and weakened at the same time the springs of the state, which could no longer rest upon a quiet or a solid foundation. A government is weakened when it assumes a false position, and it must be sensible of this weakness before it can recover its strength. It is only by a blind security that the real state of things was disguised; but after all that had occurred, it was hardly possible that this security could be much longer imagined.

The disaffected will, at all times, take advantage of every circumstance that affords any hope to them; it therefore appeared natural to those who meditated, to declare themselves as the organs of the demands of part of the Spanish nation, that they should bring forth the constitution, which they represented as having powerfully contributed to the rescue of the Penin-

sula. But there were vices in this constitution, as we have already observed, which destroyed the equilibrium of power; consequently, the opposition of the crown and the discontent of the higher classes, now returned into the kingdom, ought not to have created surprise.

Upon the king's restoration to his dominions, the nobility and clergy had recovered their preponderancy; the inquisition had been re-established, and the power of the monks had even been strengthened, by the consideration which the share they had taken in the successes obtained over the French armies had secured to them; the great landed proprietors regained what, for a time, had been lost to them; and Spain presented the same political aspect as before the event of 1808.

In this state of affairs, was it possible to expect a general concurrence in the institutions of 1812, which favoured one part of the nation, and overthrew every other interest?—trenching, moreover, upon a power that had never yet been

assailed with impunity? It was impossible for the nobility to discover in those new laws any thing more than guarantees on behalf of the people; and as pride is, of all human passions, that which offers the most formidable resistance, a deep rooted indignation and an obstinate opposition were to be expected from them. Wealth and honours in Spain are reserved, like properties of an exclusive nature, for a class of individuals, which was held in a sort of veneration by the people, who, previously to the first revolution, had never thought of presuming to any claim or share in political rights with the nobility and clergy. It may well be said, that the notions of independence which had, of late years, occasioned so many political changes in France, had stopped at the Pyrennees; and if the Spanish character had imbibed some energy from the events of the first invasion, public education had not felt the effect of it. The greatest distress prevailed in its commerce and finances, which might otherwise have formed

a counterpoise to the interests of the second class in the state, by the division of industry; and Spain, in 1820, was not different from Spain in 1807, since which time it had been afflicted, during seven years, with military occupation.

When, in 1808, the nation was called upon, by a general appeal, to shake off the French authority, this appeal was felt by all classes of a people animated with those sentiments of national pride which make them consider any foreign yoke intolerable: if to this idea be coupled the dread of seeing their religion and their wives insulted—a dread inseparable from the opinion entertained of French troops—it will easily be conceived that this universal energy, which so fully corresponded with what was expected of it, might well be depended upon.

This was not the case on an occasion when it was necessary to understand the theory of a representative system, and to create a real interest in sacrifices, the favourable results of which were dependant upon the equalisation of politi-

cal weight, a balance not to be found in the organisation of the Cortes. These ideas were too abstract for a nation reared up in habits of implicit obedience to the king's authority, as also of deep respect for the heads of the church, and of hereditary consideration for the grandees of the kingdom: so that not only the notions of the people, but their habits, their religious observances, and their prejudices, presented ready obstacles to the admission of principles that were certainly of too democratical a character to be congenial. These considerations ought to have been the first care of those persons who pretended to claim new institutions in the name of the people, even supposing the lawfulness of a course of proceeding, which, to say the least of it, was absurd. They should have reflected upon the moral state of their country, and anticipated the obstacles which their demands might have to encounter; they should have annulled whatever indicated the removal of the sovereign authority; have given to the king all those

powers with which the hereditary chief of the state ought to be vested; secured a representation for the nobility, whose titles have a brilliancy and dignity in Spain, unknown to other people; flattered the ecclesiastical body; and impressed the throne, the high classes of society, and the state, with the necessity and the advantage of a reform. The example of the French revolution should have demonstrated that a legislative assembly formed into one body, is a frightful power which overturns every thing—a monster that devours its own offspring. It appears, however, that the lessons which are afforded by the experience of a foreign country, do not carry with them a sufficient weight; nations, as well as individuals, will never profit but by the recollection of their own misfortunes.

These considerations could not be adapted to the understanding of a few Spanish regiments, which were dissatisfied at being ordered to America, and broke out into rebellion It is a

remarkable fact, that had it not been for this circumstance, which was unconnected with any political combination, the Spaniards would have continued in the state in which they found themselves, and, perhaps, the mere expression of public discontent would have suggested to the government the idea of a reform; but chance will often produce the happiest as well as the most unfortunate events, and its mandates constituted into irrevocable decrees!

The insurrection, which called aloud for the constitution of 1812, brought the period to mind when, under very different circumstances, all the powers had applauded that form of government. On the other hand, the conduct of the Spanish ministry had been partly, though tacitly, disapproved of by the European cabinets: they had foreseen the discontent which was supposed to prevail in the Peninsula; the proclamation of the government of the Cortes did not, therefore, take the foreign powers by surprise, to such a degree as to create alarm

amongst them; but they felt indignant at the manner in which the king had been compelled to accept the constitution; and they declared, in positive terms, that the revolutionary movement which had been resorted to, could only be obliterated from their minds by a wise and moderate conduct on the part of the representatives of the Spanish nation.

In this manner they were warned of the inconvenience of their position; the necessity of a great reform was pointed out; and they were reminded that their faults might be repaired, if they profited of the very errors into which they had fallen.

Inattentive to this prudent and conciliating language, the Cortes had no sooner met, than they proceeded to brave the opinion of those who loudly rejected the constitution, and the advice of foreign powers. Their views were directed to reforms which affected the highest classes, and the religious corporations; attempts were made, day after day, to diminish the influ

ence of the royal power, which could not be considered otherwise than opposed to a system that had been forced upon it. When once the centre of an edifice is undermined, its other parts can with difficulty be prevented from falling.

This constitution still contained the same defects that had been discovered when it first appeared. Those who defended it did not take the trouble to consider the great difference in the position of Spain, between the time of Napoleon's invasion and the year 1820.

Whilst the representatives in this assembly were confiding in the solidity of their work, two parties, equally powerful, were meditating to undermine this defective monument, by raising their voices against the faults that were to be found in it. The priests and monks having nothing more to apprehend from foreign troops, soon found out how much their influence was threatened by the new institutions, and taking advantage of the ascendancy which

they exercised over a religious people, they stirred up the public opinion, and raised enemies against the government of the Cortes. Those who are at all acquainted with Spain, will readily allow that the influence exercised by the religious communities, was calculated to produce a more important result than could have been effected by any foreign power; for, to unsettle public opinion is to paralyse the moral strength, which can alone offer a guarantee to political innovations: it was the only means of destroying that unity of action, so essential to the defence of a system which has been adopted, and a cause which it is intended to maintain.

Those who were attached to the king, and who partook of his apprehensions and his grief, formed themselves into a strong opposition party, which endeavoured to gain the ascendancy, and watched the opportunity for making head against its adversaries. This weighty hierarchy of the Spanish nobility, at the same time that they entertained a desire for a reform

in the government, and for giving some modifications to an arbitrary power, the recollection of which was still so painful to them, were greatly disaffected at finding themselves excluded from that rank in the representation, which they claimed as the first body in the state; so that two-thirds of Spain could derive no advantage from upholding the constitution of the Cortes.

These truths should have claimed the attention of the representatives, who professed to be met together for the protection of the national interests, and for securing the happiness of the people. Their first duty was to consult with every class; to reconcile the respective interests of each; and to expunge from the constitution whatever was found to be defective or derogatory to the royal authority, and to the aristocracy of the country. Such, however, was their state of blindness, that they neither courted the approbation of their fellow countrymen, nor the good opinion of foreign

powers. They laboured to effect a change in public opinion, without endeavouring to make amends for the revolutionary act which had spread the alarm in the several governments of Europe.

Previous to the occurrence at Naples, the Spanish revolution had been considered by France, Austria, and Russia, in no other light than an event purely national in its nature, which could only apply to the peculiar position in which the Peninsula was placed after the recollections of its past sacrifices. But when it was discovered that the insurrection in the island of Leon, and its triumph, would become an example for other nations to imitate, under the pretext of claiming new institutions, the sovereigns began to apprehend their own authority in danger, and Spain was thenceforward considered as the focus of liberal ideas.

The first general impulse of a people has always an imposing appearance to those into

whose hands a commanding power and great authority is committed; and if the Neapolitans had shown the good sense to accept the mediation of another power, and the charter which was tendered by the king, the views of foreign cabinets would have been entirely altered; the interests of nations might then have found some support and protection amongst them; kings would have upheld their own work, and the cause of the people have acquired a legitimate character. But the result of the events in Naples and Piedmont, led to the impression, that the triumph of anarchy, and of democratic institutions ought to be arrested in their progress.

The cabinets were, nevertheless, well aware that the moral force of the Spanish nation ought to be watched, before they should resort to the exercise of foreign influence: and undoubtedly, had all classes been united for the support of that unhappy constitution, no attempt would have been made to crush an unanimous determination to resist a change But it was easy to

perceive that the constitution of 1812 was permanently opposed to the interests of the most influential classes in Spain. When, therefore, public opinion had been consulted, and it was found that no reliance could be placed upon it, France was selected for putting an end to the dissentions and misfortunes which prevailed in the Peninsula.

It may not be improper in this part of our Reflections, to state, that the governments of Piedmont and of other countries were supposed to have been encouraged by the proceedings of some Spanish ministers, whose object was to induce foreign nations to adopt the institutions of their own country. These suspicions had been communicated to the several cabinets by their accredited ministers, and were calculated to create alarm, and a determination to remove the cause from whence it proceeded. Let us now see what might have been the conduct of the Cortes when they became apprised of the intentions of the cabinet of the Thuilleries, and of the language which was held by other powers.

Sect. II.

CONDUCT OF THE CORTES TOWARDS FORREIGN POWERS.

If, at the moment when France was making preparations for invading Spain, and when foreign ministers were expressing their dissatisfaction, a general cry had been heard from one extremity of the Peninsula to the other, a powerful resistance might have been expected, and the cause of the Cortes would have received a strong support; but the most blindfold had discovered by the disturbance of the 7th of July, 1822, that the very heart of the nation nourished the germ of opposition to the existing order of things. The first attempt of a party which had now reared its head, gave sufficient indication that no dependance was to be placed in a national unanimity; the great secret was brought to light, that aggression would find

very little resistance to encounter, and the discontent against a government incapable of defending itself had now become manifest.

By degrees, that army of the faith was organised, whose religious appellation was to be so effectual in fomenting opposition. These considerations should have opened the eyes of the Cortes, and led them to avert the impending storm; every thing might have been repaired if they had consulted the true interests of their country, and sacrificed their exaggerated ideas to a salutary reform that would have corrected the past errors, and warded off the misfortunes that threatened Spain: it was easy to correct and modify the constitution without destroying it. A wise government will never venture to obtain by obstinacy what may be gained by time and good management.

What were the demands set forth by France as the conditions upon which the obstacles to the political intercourse between the two countries were to be removed? It only required

that the relative powers of the state and of the monarch should be balanced in a more even scale; that the authority of the king should be freed from all restraint; and the exercise of the privileges enjoyed by the crown and by the great landed proprietors be guaranteed to them; and it was left to the good sense of the Cortes to submit to the test of experience and of the general interest, the propriety of remodelling institutions too democratical in their tendency, which, without affording any advantage to the state, created, in the existing powers, an apprehension of their own downfal: those modifications, therefore, which the welfare of the Spanish nation rendered necessary, were expected from the Cortes themselves. Neither a total overthrow of the representative system, nor any order of things essentially opposed to institutions that afforded protection to public liberty, were the objects aimed at: the intention was, I repeat it, to introduce improvements and modifica tions, but not to annihilate or to destroy

Sect. III.

CONDUCT OF FRANCE TOWARDS SPAIN.

We are now assailed with the clamour of all popular writers, and of others, who, whilst they are proclaiming the rights of the people, pretend to support them by the arguments of reason, without reflecting whether those rights can be entertained unless society be overturned, and whether they can be either acquired, maintained, or exercised for any time, as it is pretended to do, by the peremptory authority of a social compact, when the history of the past cannot be exhibited as a guarantee or as a proof of the practical application of such doctrines.

According to those writers, "a constitution bestowed by the supreme power is far from being a national acquisition; it must ever be

considered as a right emanating from the throne; and any concession from the crown may be limited at the option of the giver." Such is the doctrine brought forward to sanction the actual experiment of a reform clamoured for by the people, and to defend the organical laws framed in consequence of insurrectional movements.

It were sufficient to state, in reply to those objections, that a constitution granted by the monarch is an acquisition unattended with disorder; that it betters the condition of the people without exposing them to the horrors of anarchy; and that such advantages give to this course the preference over every other. But the nation acquires a right of property in any concession emanating from the crown; and as the acquisition would be derived from a moral necessity arising out of the force of circumstances, it could be neither arrested nor limited in its effects without occasioning the strenuous opposition of public opinion against

a proceeding equally arbitrary and unjust. If a constitution bestowed by the sovereign power is far from being a national acquisition, a constitution proclaimed by men in open revolt is as far from being lawful. But let us suppose that such theories are rational, and are justified by experience; that the principle may be admitted without any danger to social order: *Did* the French government say to the Cortes previously to the commencement of hostilities?—*Put an end to your sittings, relinquish your authority, restore to the king his former power, and annul every thing that has been done.*

It is notorious that this language was never held by the cabinet of the Thuilleries, until after the obstinate conduct of the Cortes, nor until the French armies had penetrated into the heart of Spain, and when any change had become hopeless, by the fact, no longer doubtful, that the king was actually a prisoner.

That the French invasion might have been prevented by the adoption of certain changes

and modifications in the constitution, will be sufficiently apparent from an inspection of the diplomatic correspondence which was laid before the British Parliament.

By these means the representatives of the Spanish nation would have prevented their defeat, and even maintained their pride without a compromise of their independence: by restoring to the king that power and authority of which he stood in need, they would have secured for ever a political order suitable to the whole nation, and which would have been recognised by foreign powers.

The opportunity, however, that was offered of averting the impending misfortunes, of maintaining order, and, in part at least, the political institutions, was lost in consequence of other theories, which, though more plausible and more national in their nature, are yet subject to the question, whether they be not unnecessary, and even detrimental to the public welfare.

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"No foreign force should ever be allowed to dictate laws in a country over which it possesses no claim. Neither the people nor their governments can be placed under the guardianship of other powers. No nation should ever render to the monarchs of other countries an account of its political conduct, of its administration, or of its laws. Any demand of a foreign power to this effect ought to be considered as an infringement upon the liberty and the independence of nations."

Such was the theory maintained by Spanish writers, and by their diplomatic body. We admit this principle, which is certainly entitled to its due weight; but let us apply it to the peculiar position of Spain, and of so many other states, and consider in what light must be held the exceptions which the force of circumstances and the events had given to this doctrine. Reason and justice combine to acknowledge the principle of national independence, and the unlawfulness of any right to regulate

the internal conduct of a people. But I put it to those who revolt at the violation of that principle, whether it be not more becoming to submit to certain sacrifices, with the view of preventing such a pretention from being carried into effect, and to endeavour, by concessions, to avert the misfortunes that may be occasioned by the breach of that political dogma, especially when there exist no adequate means of maintaining it.

When the interests of a nation are to be defended, reason should be the basis of those interests. The nation that is threatened with invasion will then find a ready shield in the general voice, which is but the expression of justice, and any attempt against its independence will be universally looked upon as an act of violence and an iniquitous aggression. But when its rights are compromised by measures equally improper in the source from which they have sprung, and in their exercise; and when those rights, so far from benefiting the national cause,

only disturb the tranquillity of the country, by exposing it to the heaviest calamities, the mass of the people will certainly never rise to defend them. It were much better, in such a case, to correct the defects which exhibit those rights in the character of abuses, than to persist in maintaining them with every probability of failure, and of not even being allowed the resource of making terms.

By what power is it possible to resist an unjust aggression? By the unanimous voice of an oppressed nation: for, as to the principle, we are told by the history of all ages, that it may be interpreted according to the particular interests of each state; and no dogma whatever has at any time prevented any government from claiming a right of bringing its power into contact with dangerous or anarchical doctrines. Was this voice heard throughout Spain when it was threatened with a war in consequence of its political system and its institutions? Could the representatives of the

nation be ignorant that Spain was divided in opinions and in interests;—that it was weak and without resources? In this case, what right had they to sacrifice the certainty of preserving a part of their institutions upon that basis of freedom which reason and prudence might suggest, rather than announce the capricious determination of securing a triumph to the unfortunate democratical principles of their constitution? May they not have mistaken a blind infatuation for firmness;—and the obstinacy of private ambitions for the general wish of Spain?

I shall not stop to inquire whether the tranquillity of France was placed in any real danger by the political situation of the Peninsula. This question might call for too many details, and perhaps for considerations that would become liable to the various interpretations which the minds of others might suggest to them. If the Spaniards had really possessed superior strength by their common union, and the prin-

ciples of their government could have been upheld, some influence might possibly have attended the exaltation of a people which borders upon the southern provinces of France; but the resolutions of foreign powers were not so much founded upon an apprehension of the consequences arising out of those principles, as upon their opposition to the principles themselves. Certain it is, that had the Cortes given, in proper time, some guarantees that they would make alterations in the form of their government, France would have withdrawn the troops that lined the frontiers. It may be said that France had never made any proposals, and had always refused to enter into any sort of negociation; it is precisely because France had never made any formal demand, that the Cortes would not have had the appearance of submitting to the will of a foreign power, if they had averted a declaration of war by alterations, for which their moderation and foresight might have obtained all the credit.

The cabinet of the Thuilleries had no greater wish than to avoid every act of hostility; and previously to the Congress of Verona, and until the return of the representatives from France to that Congress, although it had been decided upon that Spain should be compelled to change its institutions, the king and his ministers, so far from approving the idea of a war, which might have been less successful than the result has shown it, would have abandoned it altogether. Nothing short of the obstinacy of the Cortes could persuade France to declare its hostility. Not only was this course opposed to the pacific views of the French policy, but it was not to be denied that a war with Spain could not altogether be concurred in by the nation. A representative government, before it undertakes any measure, is always under the necessity of consulting the public opinion; and the cabinet of the Thuilleries continued to hope that a recourse to arms might still be avoided: it felt all the weight of

the responsibility which it was incurring, at a moment when all parties were understood to have united together in order to oppose the war; it will therefore be seen that the king's council hesitated a long time before it decided that the frontiers should be passed.

Since the Cortes, however, thought proper to resist any arrangement, it was to be presumed that they had calculated the resources of their country, and entertained every confidence of repelling the hostile force, and conquering every opposition; they might otherwise be deemed guilty of having sacrificed a generous people to their caprice, and compromised, in some degree, the national independence of the Peninsula. Let us now inquire what was the condition of the finances, and of the military force in Spain.

Sect. IV.

CONDITION OF SPAIN BEFORE THE WAR.

The public treasury had been exhausted by the loss of a colonial revenue of two hundred millions of livres, and the expenses in which the Spanish government had involved itself by the war with America; and during the short interval of time that had elapsed since the new government had been installed, nothing more had been done than to issue a few decrees for the sale of the property of religious communities, the only resource that could be made available. The tithes, and whatever else appeared obnoxious to the people, had been abolished. This reform was a wise, and a salutary one; but no substitute had been found for that source of revenue. Generally speaking, on the occa-

sion of any great change, the first measure resorted to, is to destroy; but it is very difficult to fill up the chasm, and loans are then resorted to. One loan had already been negociated in France; another was about to be concluded in England. The exigencies of a kingdom, yet in an unsettled state, cannot be supplied by a nation which is without the resources of an extended commerce, and which, after a six years' war, and a revolution so immediately following, had not had leisure to improve its agricultural system. A state of war would therefore place it under the necessity of borrowing large sums of money to meet the expenses. Recourse was to be had either to fresh loans, or to the unbending energy of the nation, which, when powerfully excited by enthusiasm, can submit to sacrifices so extraordinary as to break down every obstacle, and appear like miracles of patriotism; but such was not the case.

In order to succeed in any new loan, it was necessary to satisfy the bankers who were

applied to, that the triumph of the Cortes was certain. Scarcely had any minister the time to present any plan, than it was overturned by that spirit of mistrust which invariably marks the character of governments obtained by surprise.

Credit originates in confidence; and that confidence rests not only upon the existence of the property which is offered as a mortgage, but likewise upon the opinion entertained of the solidity of a government. Now it is well known, that at a time when a party had declared against the Cortes, and taken the title of *Army of the Faith*; when a regency, supported by some foreign powers, was organising a new crusade against the existing government; when France presented every indication of great warlike preparations; and when the co-operation of other powers was to be apprehended, the confidence in the cause of the Cortes was not sufficient to induce the continental bankers to place funds at their disposal. There exists but one foreign

government, that of Great Britain, which, when it is desirous of rendering the cause of another nation subservient to its own interests, will not hesitate to afford such assistance as will enable that nation to resist the common enemy. England had formerly aided Spain with its armies and its money; but its position and its interests were no longer the same as at the period when it assisted every nation in crushing the power of Napoleon. As the war of France against the Peninsula was, in appearance, a war of principle, England could not take a direct share in it by declaring itself the enemy of France; it could only enter its protest; and it did so. It will be seen hereafter, that England cannot be reproached with having adopted a different line of conduct.

The Cortes ought to have given the most serious attention to this picture of the obstacles that stood in the way of their treating for loans; and it ought to have held a conspicuous part in those considerations which made it im-

perative upon them to consent to a negociation, rather than to run the risk of being without any resource for maintaining a protracted, an obstinate, and an unavailing resistance. A national loan was out of the question, because the kingdom did not contain those large capitals which give support to a state on an occasion of great emergency. The Cortes, therefore, could only reckon upon fresh taxes, small forced loans, or the offers resulting from a great national enthusiasm in the cause. The first course was not only inadequate and uncertain, but, owing to conflicting opinions, might give rise to discontent, and be considered as a vexatious proceeding: as to the general enthusiasm and the energy of eleven millions of inhabitants, the members of the Cortes were well aware of the many partial insurrections which were breaking out in the Peninsula. They knew, or ought to have known, that the nation was by no means disposed to make common cause with the government; and be-

fore making head against a foreign enemy, the Cortes knew they had been under the necessity of sending troops to various points of the kingdom to quell the insurgents. After such positive data, how could they be so blind as to attempt to resist a foreign force, having, at the same time, to combat with internal obstacles! How could they resist availing themselves of the most favorable opportunity for avoiding a catastrophe which would disclose the weakness and inefficiency of the government, and display a striking contrast to the haughtiness of their replies to the several remonstrances that were made to them? This inconceivable conduct, therefore, must be considered as the cause of those events which have brought the drama of insurrections to a close.

It must be laid to the charge of unwise representatives, and of zealous, but imprudent writers, that, on two occasions, the opportunity has been lost of obtaining institutions conformable to the wishes of moderate per-

sons, who are eager to rally round the throne when they see it threatened with destruction, or with the loss of that respect which is its due, but who regard at the same time the rights of nations, when the object of those rights is the security of essential interests—a balance of power—the protection of the laws—and the preservation of the privileges of the crown, together with all the power which of necessity appertains to it. The opportunity of introducing ameliorations is lost by an impatience of realising in a few years, nay, in a few days, what nothing but time and reason can effect, by that unfortunate delirium of making insurrections and revolts the means for obtaining what political institutions can only acquire by the natural and peaceful course of events, prompted by a reflective attention to the actual state of society. This thoughtless impatience has its origin in the ambition of those who anticipate in sudden changes the realising of their reveries; but this impetuosity

for alteration has the effect of retarding the natural progress of the human mind. It is necessary to soften gradually the opposition presented by the customs of the ancient governments and of the established order of things. Those who attempt to hasten the course of events must fail in the mission they have assumed; they can never be reckoned the advocates of the people nor the interpreters of their wishes; they will eternally compromise their interests, and disturb the repose of nations and of individuals.

The affairs of Spain have terminated in a manner that was to be expected. The extent of resistance had been calculated from the first moment. In every direction was found a party which, so far from swelling the constitutional forces, was effectual in paralysing, and perhaps destroying them. There was no longer to be seen that national enthusiasm which bore a stamp of ferociousness during the war of 1808, when independence from a foreign power was

the object of the contest; and the cause of the Cortes now rested for its defence upon a mere party, and not upon the mass of the nation. After a lapse of nearly three years, the people had yet to discover the advantage to them of a representative assembly formed into one body, and of the undue power of its members. They had attended with eagerness to the speeches and the arguments of many leaders who were very far from sharing the obstinacy evinced by the representatives in the Cortes; and the evident indifference and apathy of the nation afforded to the French armies a sure pledge of success.

A generous nation will not relinquish the sense of its dignity upon the approach of danger; but will hesitate, however, in asserting it with energy when it is opposed to the cause which they defend, and the justice of which is very problematical. Such was the attitude assumed by Spain, upon finding that the Cortes, rather than consent to alter their constitution,

were attempting to support their own principles by means of an appeal to the nation.

Although the party that espoused the constitution of 1812 did not disgrace itself by cowardly deserting the government, still it maintained but a weak struggle, rather in its own defence than with a view to repel the foreign invader. As the enemy had no other object than to afford to a government the solidity which it did not possess, their triumph was secured by the absence of that heroic energy which a people, equally proud and brave, would have displayed in a cause of less questionable utility.

The Cortes, by their conduct, had sunk in public opinion; their obstinacy, and their refusal to come to terms, far from creating irritation against the aggressors, had displeased their warmest adherents. The people, unable to comprehend the advantage of a cause which it was called upon to defend, remained quiet spectators of passing events; and the most distin-

guished military characters, unwilling to lend their aid to ideas of an exaggerated nature, anticipated the public feeling, and prevented the consequences of an unavailing resistance, which would have had no other effect than to swell the number of the victims, and reduce the nation to a state of complete anarchy and disorder.

Some reliance had been placed on the support of Portugal; it was expected that this nation would make common cause with Spain, of which it had once been the bitter enemy, though now its feeble ally. The revolution of Portugal was looked upon by the government of the Cortes as its own work, and it was not doubted that a common interest would unite the Portuguese in its defence. But a rapid glance at the changes effected in Portugal, will be sufficient to satisfy us that the same obstacles would be presented by the same errors. Let us give our attention to the unguarded conduct pursued by the representa-

tives of the Portuguese people, as being the fourth example presented in the space of three years by ill-directed nations. The result of their proceedings will only tend to confirm us in the opinion which has originated in a knowledge of the events that have occurred in other countries, and prove to us how injudicious has been the direction given to whole populations, with the view of impressing them with the necessity of a new political existence, which the power of force alone was to secure to them, instead of leaving the attainment of it to the natural course of things.

CHAPTER V.

PORTUGAL.

The Portuguese, in the absence of their court, had followed the generous impulse given by the Spanish nation in repelling a foreign power; not only had they taken a share in the campaigns of 1809 and 1810, they had even gathered some of the first laurels.

After five years of military achievements and of patriotism, the Portuguese nation had secured for their king the possession of his dominions, which had become as it were an appendage to the Brasils. A political improvement was perhaps meditated by the people, and by those who had done so much for the national independence; but they always looked forward to the monarch's return: for it ought not to be

disguised, that the Portuguese were discontented at finding that the court should continue to fix its residence in a conquered country, and, notwithstanding the restoration of order in 1814, should prefer Rio Janeiro to the banks of the Tagus. The desire for a change was not lessened by this kind of jealousy:—but instead of endeavouring to consult the interests of the country, or the wishes of every class, and concerting with the ruling authorities the best means of submitting to the supreme power a respectful demand for a reform, *the course of* an insurrection was adopted in preference, and, in imitation of Spain, the armed force was resorted to.

The Lisbon Regency was taken by surprise —it attempted to resist; made a protest, but was compelled to give way; and the name of Pinto, which is ever connected with great events in that kingdom, was seen conspicuous in the early part of the struggle; though its influence was not of sufficient avail to effect a

change in the new direction which affairs had assumed in its country. By borrowing the constitution of the Cortes, the existing powers, the habits (so much an object of importance with a religious people), the influence of the nobility and clergy, every thing was about to disappear at a moment when the different bodies of the state were kept in alarm, and were dismissed, if we may so express ourselves, by a single class, that of persons holding no property, and by authorities suddenly created.

Never did a more favourable opportunity present itself for obtaining salutary changes than the existing one. The court, which was absent and far removed, would have been willing to grant reasonable concessions, as the reward due to a nation for having supported the crown by every kind of sacrifice. The necessity of flattering a generous people when it is intended to govern them from a great distance, rendered it almost imperative upon the King of Portugal to espouse the interests of his subjects

with sincerity, if they were founded upon a solid, a rational, and a prudent basis.

The great changes in political order have always been effected either by uniting the interests of the crown with those of the people against the abuses of aristocracy, or by a compact between the highest classes in the state and the people against the abuses of government. The history of every country presents us with frequent examples of those political amalgamations effected in order to bring about the intended object. We have witnessed the overthrow of the feudal system by means of the first combination. Diets, parliaments, states-general, chambers, councils, &c. owe their formation to the second. In those two cases only can be found united the interests of whole bodies, or of the royal authority, with the will of the majority in a nation; but if the throne and the great landed proprietors are assailed together by the people, public order is likewise assailed: such a force is therefore fictitious, for

it cannot exist without the support of the sovereign power, or of the nobility and great landed proprietors.

It has always been the privilege of the crown to originate changes in favor of its authority, and to the prejudice of aristocracy: the right of effecting changes in favor of the people and of the aristocracy against the abuses of government, can only belong to established authorities, as being the only lawful organs for exercising such a right, not by compulsory means, but by respectful petitions. Nothing can be more opposed to the success of the political changes which are meditated in our days than revolutionary means; they can only retard the progress of a well understood liberty instead of securing or accelerating it,—unless, by liberty, anarchy or democracy be intended.

With the exception of a few countries, where the laws emanate from an absolute power, Europe is no longer in that state of political

violence, when the capricious and arbitrary power of a monarch, or the oppressions of feudal lords are to be dreaded: this will enable us to discover, in the new condition of societies, the effect of a greater degree of civilisation. Time has operated this change, which has divested power of its savage nature, and our faith of its inflexible intolerance, and made those who are vested with an unlimited authority, averse to exercise it like some of their ancestors, and to make it the source of public misery. The altered state of our reasoning powers, and the development of intellect, have now drained that source of gratification which rested upon oppression; and no prince whatever can any longer assume the power or will of a tyrant.

But civilisation has not yet made sufficient progress to give to the mass of the people the stamp of moderation and quiet forbearance which it aspires to; and I do not even hesitate in saying, that it will never pro-

duce the salutary effect of morally influencing millions of men, or of regulating the passions of nations, so as to bring them in accordance with the feelings and reflections of individuals. What ascendancy can reason exercise over an unbridled multitude, which no sooner imagines its superior strength to be somewhat increased, than disorder becomes its element? The changes, therefore, to which men aspire, can only relate to forms in the exercise of power. But why seek to destroy, with a view of securing the acquisition of those forms? By so doing, a character of aggression is assumed; and it is impossible to conciliate all the interests of the several classes which are founded on the right of possession.

To return to the subject: Portugal neither knew how to profit by the absence of the court, by the advantage which its sacrifices might have afforded to it, nor by the claims which it had upon the generosity of its sovereign. By adopt-

ing an absurd constitution it had to encounter the same obstacles, and would derive the same results as were experienced by those from whom it had been borrowed. The discontent of the nobility was only exceeded by that of the religious corporations; those two powerful bodies pledged themselves to conquer in the struggle, and success crowned their efforts.

The king received in the Brazils the news of the revolution of Portugal, and foresaw the consequences of it, and the effect which it would produce over his American dominions: he perhaps regretted his absence as one of the causes to which the change was to be ascribed, a change that would infallibly occasion the heaviest calamities, although it had been effected without disorder.

The Portuguese possessed every means of averting the evils which were likely to result from the vices of the constitution; it was in their power, in some measure, to make

the *amende honorable* for any deviation in their fealtry, as no obstacles were offered to their political labours. The English government exemplified on this occasion how much they respected the principle of independence asserted by other nations, and conducted itself with a remarkable degree of moderation; but moderation was a virtue to which the government of the Portuguese Cortes were insensible. They began to quarrel upon words, as is the case in all tumultuous assemblies; they waged open war against religious corporations, and attacked the absolute *veto* of the king, reserving a conditional *veto* to the executive power; they thus presented the shadow of an authority without any reality.

The king discovered, upon his return, that he could not resist, at the moment, a system which had sprung out of the exaggerated ideas of a people who had erred, by attempting to adopt the errors of its neighbours: he yielded to the force of necessity. The Portuguese fan-

cying themselves secured, by their geographical position, from the reach of all foreign influence, disregarded the oppositions which were naturally forming in the interior. Thus the edifice was no sooner erected, than it threatened to give way for want of a more solid foundation.

Instead of obstinately proscribing the queen in the most disrespectful and inconsiderate manner, instead of irritating the feelings of those whose attachment ought to have been secured, the Cortes of Portugal should have derived a lesson from the discontent which the events of Spain had given to foreign cabinets, and have presented a salutary reform that would have had the effect of baffling all the efforts of the approaching opposition. The Portuguese government could not object, as a reason, that a foreign power was threatening to dictate laws to them; and they would have had the double advantage of acting with independence, and of setting an

example of moderation and of wisdom; the opportunity was favorable for repairing the evils produced by political disunion, and they were already threatened with a storm which, however concealed, was ready to burst upon them at a moment. But such was the blindness of men, who, because they were the partial representatives of the people, fancied themselves stronger than the united sentiment of Europe, despised all advice, and disdaining any measure that moderation pointed out, compromised their own party instead of serving it. What was the result of this helpless security of the Portuguese Cortes? The same army which took the lead in the insurrection of August, 1820, and had so hastily taken upon itself to represent the nation, now thought proper to act a different part: instead of protecting the institutions which it had proclaimed, it came forward to overturn them; and those who had been compelled to obey the will of the army, had gained authority in their turn,

and commanded it with a view to exact their revenge. The catastrophe of the revolution of Portugal, like that of Naples, of Piedmont, and of Spain, gives rise to the same reflections upon the vicious nature of a constitution without a balance of power, and upon the system, as defective as it is unlawful and absurd, of attempting to destroy institutions without knowing how to raise a superstructure upon their ruins. Revolutions are the medium through which the ambition of a few individuals works upon the credulity of the mass of the people, in order to obtain a power much more absolute than any which preceded it.

CHAPTER VI.

CONDUCT OF GREAT BRITAIN AND OF FRANCE DURING THE LATE WAR.

Let us pause here, and be careful not to assume the character of prophets, nor set up general theories and maxims founded upon abstract rights, nor presume to foretel what shall come to pass, or guarantee the infallible duration of any event; as we are persuaded that all these results must depend upon the reciprocal conduct of governments and of the people: that when the former are well advised, and the latter well directed in their line of duties, they can then attain that political harmony which secures them from great re-actions. The course to be

avoided, or to be pursued, is taught only by the experience of past events. Let us then inquire into the conduct followed by England, and the language held by the two parties in France before the war had commenced, and likewise into the true consequences of the events in Spain, as affecting the French government.

The cabinet of St. James' had protested, as early as the congress of Leibach, against the principle of interfering in the internal organisation of a foreign government. This protest was a necessary consequence of the principles of the British government; which, however strong it may be in its course, must submit, as it were, an account of its obedience, to public opinion that gives it strength; and it would be difficult for an English administration to act in direct opposition to the sentiments of a nation so strongly attached to the principles of equity and to the integrity of character.

Although the commanding influence which England necessarily exercised during the whole time of the coalition war against Napoleon, enabled it to overthrow so troublesome a power, it felt itself incapable any longer of making common cause with the continental states. Jealous of maintaining the isolated character of its moral and political condition, its constitution and national dignity required that it should separate its interests from those of other governments; no reasoning could persuade Lord Castlereagh (who was thought to be in some degree a minister of the continental powers) or the cabinet of St. James', to give the consent of England to the treaty of the Holy Alliance. The independence of England was sufficiently manifested to Europe; and it was well known that the principles of its policy could never be the same as those of the continental powers. From the very nature of its legislation, the attempt to call the abuse of power a right,

would, at once, awaken discussion within the walls of St. Stephen's; and if in any case of urgency it is found necessary to yield for a moment to such a principle, it is never admitted to be justifiable in its nature. Lord Castlereagh was unjustly reproached with having sacrificed the interests and the honor of his country by too great a condescension to the continental and aristocratic powers.

It was made a ground of remark against him, that at the Congress of Leibach he had confined himself to a simple protest, and it was thought that his principles and his influence were the occasion of this reserve. He was succeeded by Mr. Canning, who, when France declared war against Spain, limited himself likewise to a protest, which was, perhaps, more energetic than the preceding one at the Congress of Leibach. The British government, contrary to the hopes of those who wished to prevent the Spanish war, did

not think proper to bid open defiance to France. The cabinet of St. James' deemed it sufficient to refuse its approbation of the measure, in order to assert the inviolability of its moral policy and its fundamental doctrines; but to have declared open war merely for the maintainance of a principle, would have been to compromise the interests of the nation.

The British government, after the enormous expenses entailed upon it by the immense subsidies supplied to all Europe during upwards of twenty years, was frightened for a moment at contemplating the weak state to which the public debt had reduced the nation. This moment might have been fatal to its credit, and no less so to its influence and to its strength. It was for a short time exposed to the unceasing complaints of all the working classes, which the desperate state of their circumstances had thrown into great agitation. This alarming state of affairs was the means of pointing out

to the administration the line of its duties, and the course it ought to follow. In England it is an imperative maxim to do only what is right. All the measures adopted by the wisdom of the government were at that time directed to a diminution of the enormous debt by which the nation was oppressed, and the sources of its industry dried up.

If the British ministry had undertaken a war in favour of Spain, they would have been compelled to raise new loans, or at least to withhold from the sinking fund the amount which is assigned for a reduction of the heavy deficiency. Owing to this consideration, the peninsular war could not be purely national for England, or rather it was national in point of right, but not essential to be engaged in. The opposition, therefore, did not call for a war. The conduct of the French government was openly disapproved of; but the importance of the protest was intended to apply solely to a moral influence, which often ends by carrying all oppo-

sition before it—but as its triumph is generally slower than that of physical power, it is occasionally laid aside, and its authority disregarded.

To this consideration may be added the uncertainty existing as to the state of public opinion in Spain. The British ministry was aware of the disunion which began to prevail in the Peninsula; it had been surprised at the increased opposition to Spain, which was daily acquiring strength, owing to the absurd conduct of the Cortes. If it declared for Spain against France, it might question, and with good reason, whether it was the cause of the nation in general it had to sustain, or that of a party; it would then have had to look for the co-operation of a portion of Spain only, and not of the whole Spanish nation.

It was this consideration, perhaps, rather than any other, that made the ministry pause; and instead of taking a decided part, it looked on and waited the result. It might be supposed,

that if England had seen a genuine enthusiasm, and an energetic resistance displayed throughout the country, it would have altered its policy: but as the Cortes had not been able to secure the confidence of the whole nation; since by their obstinacy they had alienated the minds and the hearts of the inhabitants of the Peninsula; if England had openly stepped forward to defend their cause, such a proceeding would have had the appearance of an attempt to force the Spanish nation to espouse the cause of the democratical party. To have acted this part would have been tantamount to an infringement, not only of the principle of respect for the independence of other states, but would have been likewise contrary to the British constitution, which we cannot but look upon to be a masterpiece of wisdom, owing to the balance of power, and the dignity enjoyed by the crown, a balance and a dignity entirely wanting in the Spanish constitution.

If the Spaniards themselves were very far

from thinking their government perfect, by protecting the acts of the Cortes, too much strength would have been granted to the democratic party, and to do this, would have been to declare in favor of an order of things, in direct contradiction to their acknowledged principles of policy.

The hopes, however, of those who were adverse to the war with Spain, and desirous of preventing it, rested in some measure upon an energetic declaration, emanating directly from the cabinet of St. James. This expectation was founded upon a false reasoning, deduced from the supposed necessity of England's preventing France from obtaining that influence which it would naturally exercise over the Peninsula; but upon mature reflection, it was easy to perceive that the French ministry was far from seeking any other influence than what was indispensable for arrestingthe progress of a government too democratical in its nature, the existence of which might be a source of disquietude for

France. England understanding clearly the views of the cabinet of the Thuilleries, has always been satisfied that the relations between France and Spain could at no time be injurious to its own maritime interests: and even admitting that this might have been the case, it behoved the British minister to wait until France should give it a real cause of alarm; then a warlike attitude would have been justified by its interests and its policy, and Spain might have been defended by British bayonets.*

The language of the replies given by the British ministers to certain questions from the

* We will here slightly allude to the affairs of the American colonies. It was imagined that the fate of those immense territories might be decided by the influence of any one power. I believe that the States of America feel as much embarrassment with respect to their emancipation, as is felt by the governments of Europe to reduce them to obedience.

In order to succeed in obtaining a solid and a permanent independence, it requires a greater degree of civilisation,

Parliament, had been interpreted by some in a manner favourable to their own views. But

more national habits—more strength, than are possessed by the American states. The United States had long had before their eyes a fine model in the mother country. They availed themselves of it, and when their independence became a question, they found themselves in a condition to declare it. Industry, civilisation, and laws, follow every where in the train of England. This country may well be called a benefit to mankind. If Mexico and Peru had, in their social condition, been on a par with the United States, their emancipation would offer no difficulty; but in those immense countries the object has rather been to procure wealth from the mines than to ameliorate the condition of the natives; so that for a long time to come, the insurgents of Spanish America will have great difficulties to surmount before they can become organised. As to European influence, it may be taken for granted, that no power can exercise it in a sufficient degree to confine the political convulsion to which Spanish America is a prey. Hers is the agitation of a weak and staggering giant, but at the same time it is possible for her to assume a colossal strength: a foreign government exerts most influence where it can move an army of 100,000 men in any direction at a moment's notice.

we ought to be well aware that the British ministry is often obliged to make use of a language somewhat different from that which it employs in the secret instructions to its agents The cabinet of St. James is always intent on the means of satisfying the public opinion, which may occasionally be at variance with the conduct marked out to the government by its political interests. In order, therefore, to ward off an opposition which it would not be possible to make acquainted with the real tendency of its plans until they had been carried into effect, it secures for a time the public approbation, by a language which is flattering to the national honour, and withholds the justification of its actual proceedings for a later opportunity. Each state may be said to aim at a different object in the course adopted by its government: some maintain as their principle the monarchical interests; that of England consists in the interests of the nation: the strength of one government will hinge upon the power of

individuals; whilst the *sovereignty* of commerce, the activity and industry of the people, and a religious and unalterable respect for the laws, will form the basis of another.

The arguments of the party and of the individuals who declaimed against the war with Spain, had no better foundation than those that were adduced for the declaration of England. As all the opinions set forth, all the speeches made on that occasion, bear an exclusive reference to France, and indicate the fears entertained of the annihilation of the liberties and securities which the charter had granted, by a foreboding, as it were, of disastrous consequences, let us inquire whether those opinions and alarms were well grounded, and whether results, different from what were apprehended or foretold, are likely to follow upon the issue of that war.

CHAPTER VIII

STATE OF FRANCE.

Before we examine the opinions of a party, let us glance at the position and the language of certain individuals who are in opposition to it

As a foreigner, and a mere observer, though a friend to order and to truth, and warmly attached to the principles of respect for legitimate power, I may express my opinions without prejudice or party spirit, however great my motives for abhorring revolutions and whatever tends to encourage them. I shall state my view of things and of events without sacrificing my opinion for those of others on the grounds of propriety or of courtesy.

Both parties cast exaggerated reproaches

upon each other: the one insists that its oppo nents aim at changing the present dynasty, or at withdrawing its allegiance from it, and at establishing a republican state; the other charges its antagonists with attempting to abolish the charter; to re-establish absolute power, privileges, and feudal rights, and give to France the same form of government that was in existence thirty years before the revolution. All mo derate persons steer clear of those ideas, and are far from giving expression to such absurdities. Let us inquire, therefore, whether there exists any foundation for the fears which either party pretend to entertain.

First, as to those whose views are directed to a republican government, &c.

Can the wish for a republic be sincerely entertained by any individual in France? This idea is to me a political atheism, especially if applied to powerful states, and to countries where the organisation of families has taken such deep root; and I am, therefore, not more convinced

that every man of candour rejects the absurdity of the system of allowing creative attributes to *chance*, than that the republican party is not in a greater ratio than as twenty-six to twenty-six millions. What attention then can we bestow upon it? All those who prefer against certain individuals the charge of republican ideas, arraign them also of attempting to alter the dynasty. Now there is a contradiction in supposing the same persons anxious to establish an American constitution, and harbouring at the same time the desire of placing any other than the Bourbon family on the throne of France. Admitting, however, the possibility of giving to twenty-five millions of people the same direction as to one hundred thousand men in a very limited circle, by what means could the establishment of a republic be brought about? It would be necessary to go through the ordeal of a great revolution, by means of a catastrophe perhaps less appalling as to form than the first; but which would stand

in need of more resources, and of a more united force, in order to maintain itself against the present state of Europe, widely different from what it was in 1789. England might be found exhausted in pecuniary means; but the Continent might collect together a million of men, who no longer wage war to obtain by conquests or by treaties an extension of frontiers for each state; but in order to resist every attempt at revolt, and to put down the insurrectionary movements of different nations.

With the view of becoming a republic, France, which is so flourishing by its wealth, its commerce, and its internal tranquillity, and by the enjoyment of institutions hitherto unknown to it, would have to renounce all such advantages in order to second the wishes of those who might hold out a greater degree of liberty and independence to it, but who would require, at the same time, the sacrifice of all its guarantees, and of its present quiet and happy condition, for prospects quite

uncertain, and probably at variance with the expectations originally held out.

The only means of establishing a republic, would be to introduce partial banishment (ostracism), or not to allow that one general should obtain greater success than another; a limit should be given to his victories, to his triumphs, and to the display of his genius, so that he might not acquire more glory than is consistent with his dependance upon the tribunes of the people. A barrier should be placed to the progress of ambition in a warrior who, after having saved his country, returns under the protection of his bayonets, to seat himself upon a throne which had been overturned by ambitious popular leaders; for on such occasions the *pretended patriots* no longer dare to raise their impotent voices in presence of the hero, and proclaim absolute power with the same eagerness and enthusiasm which they had displayed in proscribing those who had refused to join in the revolt.

Supposing these obstacles to have no existence, what advantage could be derived from a republican state? What certainty have those who desire its establishment, that they would always hold the situations of ministers, presidents, or directors in it?—for such is the aim of persons who maintain high democratical doctrines. But when they have established the power of the people, are they sure of enjoying for the shortest time its good opinion and its fickle favors? Would not denunciations, arraignments, and proscriptions be thundered forth against them? Would not every man possessed of talents, of eloquence, or of boldness, think himself more competent to decide upon the fate of his country than those by whom its institutions had already been proclaimed and defended from aggression?

The example of the United States is to Europe a chimera, and can the less be quoted, as I am convinced no Frenchman can feel any thing but alarm at the very idea of seeing him-

self in the midst of a republican government. The last ten years of the eighteenth century should ever be present to the imagination of those whose minds are most under delusion, as a truly frightful picture: and if it should be asked of sincere democrats what has been the tendency of all the crimes committed by the republic, it will not be denied by them that they have only served to pave the way for an arbitrary government, more brilliant, but not less absolute. Let them be asked, however, if, in the situation in which it had placed itself, France could well oppose this change, they will give a negative reply. Thus the return to a system of monarchical unity was the necessary result of a series of disorders, of crimes, of sacrifices, and calamities: the more the world was amazed at the prodigies of valour performed by the French armies, the nearer the moment was at hand, when France, exhausted, weakened by its organisation, convulsed by a spirit of discontent which had

succeeded to a state of delirium, would insensibly lend its aid to a power that was to become absolute, and that was forming itself at a distance, and in spite of all opposition.

But are men no longer the same? Are men become capable of giving a guidance to their passions, so as to render them subservient for the future to the dictates of reason? Does there really exist a prevailing sentiment of philanthropy which blunts every feeling of ambition, and upholds the cause of humanity to the exclusion of all personal interest? Supposing that the only object in view is the defence of the cause of humanity, can it be denied that the ingredient of great depravity is infused in a great degree of civilisation, and that an incalculable augmentation of wants is felt in all classes of society in an enlightened nation? Do not all ambitious views originate in the necessity of gratifying new desires? And are not the absurd dreams of a republican system created by those designs? In this point of view there

exists no other difference between the actual state of nations and the preceding one, than that the envious passion of ambition and of vanity, the thirst after power and wealth, which are the appendage of and possessd by certain classes, are become of universal prevalence.

That democratical system, so loudly called for by some, is proclaimed for no other reason than that each individual aims at aristocracy for himself, or, in other words, wishes to rise to an equality with those above him. Abuses are so loudly complained of, for no other reason than that they are exclusively carried on by others: the more civilisation and knowledge are held up to view, the greater will be the eagerness for wealth, power, and inequality of ranks, independent of the effect produced upon public morals; for it is beyond a doubt, that in times less civilised, immorality and crime were confined to a single class; and that at present, when the more enlightened mass of the people are in the enjoyment of all the advan-

tages of an extended civilisation, they likewise present to our view the spectacle of vices and an equalisation of crime in every class. In former times ignorance was imposed upon; at present every man has a price offered for his voice: commands were formerly no sooner given than obeyed; corruption is now resorted to: absurdity has been succeeded by immorality. Under these circumstances it is more than madness—it is the height of ridicule to dream of a republican system.

The want of attachment to the existing dynasty is another species of accusation directed against those who are called liberals, or else partisans of a revolution, (for it seems that, with many people, words are not to express their exact meaning). I can scarcely believe that there are Frenchmen who, with a true regard for their own interest, can consider the princes of the House of Bourbon in any other light than as the only guarantees of French independence. The present dynasty, which has existed for eight centuries, secures to twenty-five mil-

lions of people a form of government which they had never before possessed, and claims, at the same time, the consideration and respect of other powers. I would ask of those who may think otherwise (should any such be found), an explanation of the views they might entertain, if the reign of the existing royal branch were to cease? Are they for electing a king? They must take him from amongst foreigners. But would not this circumstance disqualify him for Frenchmen? Would he not rouse the indignation of a people accustomed to see none but French princes seated on the throne of Clovis? What expectations could be held out by a king taken from amongst foreigners? What guarantees could he afford to France? He might, perhaps, be compelled to swear to the code of laws that would be presented to him; but as to forming a political code different from the existing one, for this a revolution must again be effected, and it must be proved to all Frenchmen, that more advantages are open to them by the second than by the first constitu-

tion. If France were placed in such a position, how could it reckon upon the means of dictating laws? Would the great powers that adjoin its frontiers remain quiet spectators of events, and resist the temptation of taking advantage of them?

Would it be possible for a Frenchman to ascend the throne of St. Louis? What are his means of success? He would have to cover its steps with fresh victims; threaten anew the repose of France and of Europe; conquer, triumph, and secure the general consent of other powers. A colossal event does not recur twice in an age; a great moral phenomenon is of more rare occurrence than a great physical one. Let us, therefore, be persuaded, that Frenchmen of the most exaggerated ideas, if they are to be so called, are too well informed not to be convinced that the only guarantee for France and for Europe is in the dynasty of the Bourbons; and that this dynasty, having marked the commencement of its return to the throne of its

ancestors by the gift of a charter, posterity will always acknowledge Louis XVIII. as the author of so great a benefit, and will hand down the Restoration to the unqualified praise of their successors, who will place that event amongst the most memorable epochs in history. For a Frenchman, in my opinion, there should be no difference between being a liberal and a partisan of the Bourbons. Where will be found a king who has had it in his power to give such excellent institutions to his subjects? Can many such examples be furnished by the records of European governments? The question may be easily solved. For, after all, is there really not a national pride in the reflection, that the princes who are destined to govern France are the successors of twenty kings, amongst whom we find names which history will ever present to us as entitled to the praise, the gratitude, and the love of a great people?

The liberals wage war against the ministry, and they will always do so; for their policy

naturally places them in the ranks of the opposition: and if to-morrow the king were to select his ministers from amongst them, their political enemies would take up similar principles to attack them. In France there is to be found no warm attachment for any other ideas than those which originate in enthusiasm; and great actions, or useful institutions, are the only excitements to this enthusiasm. France has too much attended to conquests in former reigns; but it has had no real institutions until the present one. A degree of perfection, or at least of relative perfection, is sought for; and it is not considered that those who reign, and who govern nations, are men as well as those who obey and who complain; that every thing degenerates into abuse, and that there is a constant solicitude to obtain what is not within our reach.

Let us now inquire whether the apprehensions, or at least the language of some persons belonging to the liberal party, is more founded in reason than the language of their adversaries.

Let us begin with the general outcry occasioned by the Spanish war. It had been asserted that the object of the government was to prelude by an example in Spain, and afterwards to imitate in France its results. We shall inquire if such an idea could be founded upon any solid reasoning. This declaration ought to be sufficient, that precisely upon the same principle through which it was wished to abolish the constitution of Spain, it will be desirable to maintain the French charter. The Spanish constitution was announced by an insurrection of the people, who obliged the king to accept it. The French charter was the gift of the king, and the nation was invited to the enjoyment of it; wherefore, for the very reason that the recognition of the first was refused, the second, which guarantees the principles of legitimacy and the privileges of the crown, will always be sedulously maintained. We will proceed to discuss this subject more fully. Has any one

an interest to abolish the charter? Has the king, the ministry, or any party such a wish? Where would be the king's interest in preferring an absolute authority, if the national representation renders him more powerful, richer, and more respected, giving him greater weight, greater resources, and without responsibility attaching to him? I ask, if ever France under her kings, before the revolution, or during the reign of Napoleon, paid to the state and to the crown so considerable a revenue as at the present? And if any minister, in the days of the absolute monarchy, would ever have dared to demand so many subsidies of the nation as under the representative government that is enjoyed in France? Lastly, I ask, if the king of France being enabled to exercise all the rights of the crown without partaking any responsibility for the acts of government, is not a state preferable to every other mode of enjoying power, which, in exchange for the single advantage, that the

king should not be cramped by a national representation, makes him take upon himself the entire burthen of the fate of his people? How is it possible for a king not to become more powerful with the voice of the deputies of his people and the peers of his kingdom, than with an absolute will? For if any burthen oppresses his subjects, they can complain only of their representatives or of the ministers. So that the king of France can have no interest in preferring a kind of power which cannot be so extensive or so solid as that which he now enjoys.

But is it the desire of ministers? How have the present ministers, and all those who have preceded them, made known the requisite talents by which they were deemed fit to be placed at the head of affairs? Is it not to the tribune, the liberty of the press, and the kind of government which it is assumed they are opposed to, that they are indebted for their political existence and their elevation?

The king would never have been made acquainted with so many enlightened men without the evidence of the legislative chambers: and those who are no longer ministers, or who have never yet been such, have they not the constant hope of meriting, by their eloquence, or by the support of their party, to be made choice of by the monarch? Is not a ministry, when strengthened by a national representation, ten times more powerful than all the authorities under a government which does not possess the same advantages? And is the glory of being placed at the head of whatever is talented, in a great nation like that of France, a thing not to be taken into account? What, besides, are the advantages that could arise to a ministry from a different state of things? I am persuaded that not one of those who are supposed to partake of ideas and projects which they never have done, would desire to change the place of being a minister of France for any other political condition. In what

way is power affected by a well-organised representative government under the direction of wise and enlightened men? The will of the king, influenced by his privy council, is approved and supported by the deputies of the nation. The legal expression, *nous voulons ce que vous voulez*, uttered by the representatives of the people at large, and of the proprietary, flatters a nation extremely, and gives a weight of authority and security to the king's power, sheltered from every danger.

Any undertaking may be entered upon which has the consent of a legislative body; and it is quite astonishing to behold the enormous sacrifices a state is capable of bearing, when the sanction of a constituted body renders legal the demand of such sacrifices. But when this public voice is wanting, the minister of a legislating monarch remains continually watchful and fearfully anxious respecting the result of many measures he may think proper to adopt.

Is there a party formed for this object? Which party then? Whatsoever party has strength, influence, or character, does it not owe all to that representative constitution which gives birth to the possibility of gaining a preponderance? Is there any prevailing party in Austria, Russia, or Prusia? And does not that which exists in France hope to obtain, through its influence, what everywhere else can be obtained solely through the favor of persons in office?

Is this party, however, the aristocracy, and the old class of privileged persons? This is another alarm spread by certain people. We shall proceed to examine such an idea. There is a constant cry that the privileged classes and the aristocracy will be able to re-assume their ancient position and their ancient rights; fears are even entertained of the revival of the feudal system: yet, at what time has the notion arisen, that men at the head of a government would desire to paralyse a branch of

the national revenue, that they may thereby grant to the seignorial proprietors the ancient privileges, by virtue of which they paid no impost to the state? Both the monarch, the ministry, and such a party, have an interest directly contrary to the re-establishment of those privileged classes such as they formerly were. The springs of social order are so completely changed, that it is impossible to restore the ancient *seigneurs*, where now there are prefects and sub-prefects established, together with municipalities, a comptroller, and a receiver under government: then, after all, although an aristocracy in France is continually spoken of, there is no country in Europe that is less aristocratic in point of fact.

The noble inheritance of names famous in history, and illustrious by their ancestry, cannot be taken from numerous families that will ever preserve a claim to the regard of both Frenchmen and foreigners. Institutions will never effect any alteration in the renowned

actions which appertain to the brightest names of France, and which time has converted into monuments and tablets of glory to the nation; but this power, which they must always hold in public opinion, has no bond of union with the new organisation of social order.

Where is the country which would not be deprived of its greatest honor, if it were unable to display the assemblage of a virtuous aristocracy that would recal to mind the high actions of the nation? The archives of these illustrious families are often the records of their country, and they cannot be disparaged or left abandoned on the shelf, without disinheriting a nation of its most valued property.

Is it amongst insurrections, massacres, and proscriptions that we are to seek for the titles which society has to celebrate?—or in the recollection of the chivalrous feats of the nobles, the independent spirit of the magistracy and the piety and beneficence of the prelates?—What would have become even of letters,

science and philosophy, without the encouragement and protection of the great names which, in France, more than in other countries, have declared themselves the friends of the people? But why should people resolve to believe that no consideration, no honors can be granted to that class without a return to their exclusive rights, and to the abuses of the past age?

It is by the more general diffusion of property by the means of commerce, that ancient usages are altered into a more equalised bearing. Bring about a concentration of money in the hands of a single class; effect also that the army shall be solely under the command of that class; and finally, that the mayors and the local authorities shall submit no longer to the government, but be dependant on the *seigneurs*;— then, if you choose, let the cry be raised of a return to the ancient aristocratical dominion. But when you see the very contrary of all the above suppositions, how is it possible to be under alarm as to the renewal of privileges?

Property in fee is at present in such a state of degradation, through the low price of productions, that a new kind of revolution is thereby in preparation against the great landed proprietors; so that there is no solid wealth but that which is founded on industry and commerce. Now, as the whole body politic depends upon an enlightened financial administration, the influence to be feared, is rather that of the colossal fortunes, that resemble mines, in which the governments are habituating themselves to fathom their policy. Such are the actual privileges peculiar to a few individuals, and which, with a reference to no ancient date, ground their enormous power upon the necessities of the new social system, which real property can no longer uphold if unassisted. Here is a new principle of power, that has assumed the character of an essential prop to the modern edifice of politics, and which will prove the more active, as it will not be counteracted by any substantial force: here

then are beheld immense levers, with which the mass of the people can be actuated, as well as individual politicians and literary men, according to whatever direction the persons who move them, may desire: herein, in fine, are the sources and the means of general corruption, by which often those characters are engulfed, who set out in politics as men *fitted for a greatly advanced state of civilisation, and the increased knowledge of the age.*

A few measures taken to direct public instruction, the writings and the speeches of some members belonging to the religious orders, have created an outcry respecting a pretended plan of causing the French nation to go back, and of enslaving it under a yoke of ignorance and of superstition: but these fears are no better founded than the former ones; for, in the first place, it would be required for us to believe that the government saw a great advantage, not only in approving, but in fostering the plan of those fraternities, under a suppo-

sition that their plan could really embody a great influence, which is an absurdity. Governments understand better than the people do, their true interests; and if, on some occasions, they have been mistaken, they have, in the end, corrected their own faults by the exertion of their power; which could with difficulty be effected by the people themselves, who never know how to retrace a wrong course but after the event has proved in contradiction to their object. Yet, setting aside this consideration, let us inquire if it be possible for ignorance and superstition to take real hold of the public mind.

If the great changes in society are solely to be attributed to the effects of the press and commerce, how is it to be believed that any barrier or course can be applied in opposition to the powerful influence of those two great springs, which act upon every class and all nations, from Vera-Cruz to Archangel? Were you to suppress all the journals, close

the ports, destroy the canals, burn every book, shut up all the theatres, prevent the communications of commerce and correspondence by letter, impose silence on enlightened preachers, forbid travels and communication with travellers, then might you begin to have reasonable fears as to the influence of superstition and ignorance. At the very time that the authority of the fraternities, which have been so virulently assailed, was almost unquestioned; at a time when the first families made a part of these congregations, which should not at any rate be deprived of the merit of the great discoveries in the sciences, the great works in literature, and the great services rendered to the chief universities; at the time, I say again, when every thing countenanced their power, what was the result of their extraordinary influence? They assisted the impetus given to the human mind rather than they subdued it. It may be declared, that the eighteenth century has been their

work; for all the great men whom fame has crowned, whether in literature or politics, were taught in their schools: and it must not be forgotten, that their fall did not take place before they had spread their doctrine throughout all the colleges of youth, and had tutored by its rule each man's conscience; nor until those corporations had become possessed of the largest properties in Europe!

Now compare their former with their present state, and we shall soon be convinced how much the alarms that have been spread of late are destitute of foundation. Governments in general are not partial to the orders beyond a certain point, for they are well aware that there is no real moral influence transmitted hereditarily as it were from one to another, but that which proceeds from them. It has now become a very scarce occurrence to induce men's consciences to make grants for the temporal profits of a religious community, if that community does not preside over pious

charities for the consolation of the miseries of humanity. Yet, after all, why should those speeches or writings be so much dreaded, which it is in our power to answer, or to attack and expose, if they are considered at all dangerous? I must always repeat, that where there is an administrative and executive legislature that forms one branch of the supreme power, there never will exist any other influence besides that of the government and of public opinion: and whereas public opinion is generated principally by the journals, by the speeches of the representatives, by the conduct of the public authorities, by the example of the princes, by the affection of the people for their monarch, and by the commercial interest, any other influence whatever is futile, or must speedily become so.

Before I conclude this chapter, I shall indulge in some reflections upon the political consequences of the war in Spain

It may possibly appear very singular to

many persons, that the issue of the Spanish war, which has been supposed to be in favour of absolute power, should only furnish, according to my sentiments, a fresh guarantee of the representative constitution of France. This assertion will, I am certain, be assailed as a paradox, yet I shall never renounce my view of the ultimate result.

Many persons thought that the French government, before it marched an army across the Pyrennees, was in doubt and anxiety respecting the armed force it had at its disposal. What rendered its situation more precarious was, the possibility that the other cabinets took the same view of its position with respect to the army; although it is my opinion that, in point of fact, at any moment, and under every circumstance, a king of France can never be otherwise than convinced that he will be obeyed when he commands his subjects to have recourse to arms.

Such an idea terminated of the actual state

of France, gave its attitude a degree of weakness in the estimation of foreign powers, and as state policy avails itself of every circumstance in which it finds or thinks it sees every nation, the cabinets draw an advantage therefrom, either in the tone of their diplomacy, or in the consideration of the propriety of interfering, or in the greater or less degree of influence which it will be attempted to be exercised, as well as in the preponderating power which will be kept in reserve for governing the fate of events. I assume this view of the case, and am persuaded, that previous to her late successes in Spain, France was looked upon as a feeble and unsettled country, owing to the opposition that was thought to exist between the interests of the government and those of the nation. It was imagined by some, that public opinion rather tended to paralyse than to strengthen the power of government. But as nothing gives a stronger argument to diplomatic reasoning than the supposed weakness

of a state, I am convinced, that after the astonishing proofs of attachment and of strict discipline displayed by the French army in Spain, the opinion of foreign cabinets with regard to France has been materially changed. I now ask, whether a powerful influence, and the position of mediator to other states, are not the becoming attributes of a nation which is jealous of its independence, and not impeded either by a national representation, by its debates, by its political speeches or writings, any more than by the artifices of party, from holding a power so devoted to the sovereign authority, as effectually to protect the throne, and to cause its own institutions and liberties to be respected?

Since the Spanish war was a war against principles, the foreign powers were bound, in case of need, to concur in effecting their total overthrow. I am not aware then of the influence which such a concurrence might have had over the fate of France; and since 'after what

had been determined upon at Verona) the war was become unavoidable, owing to the conduct of the Cortes, was not a greater advantage obtained by preventing the interference of other nations? What consequences might not have ensued if the French government had felt a want of confidence in the military? If those whose wishes prompted them to doubt of the attachment of the troops had but reflected upon the necessary result of the most trifling commotion, they would have shuddered at the imminent danger impending over French liberty. Foreigners would have taken a part in the struggle; the southern provinces would have witnessed the return of four hundred thousand soldiers. The national independence would have received a fatal blow from a political schism springing out of the opinion of the army, foreign protection would have been extended to an enfeebled government, and a seasonable opportunity held out to persons opposed to a representative system, for proclaiming that

France could no longer subsist under a form of government which was only productive of insubordination and revolt! A more favorable pretext could not be presented for endeavouring, by all the power of influence, to destroy the noble work of Louis XVIII.! that influence would no longer be exerted in the dark; and what, under any other circumstances could never be but a latent wish, would then be loudly called for. It is evident, therefore, that if even the principle of invasion could be made a matter of reproach, it cannot be denied that the result has secured for France more consideration, and for the constitutional system a greater degree of independence from all continental influence. If the ministry has not been sparing of money, if energy has been displayed by the executive power, the aid and support of the Chambers have not, however, been disregarded. Can there be found a better guarantee for the monarch, the ministry, or the nation, than this happy experiment of a reciprocal confidence? Rather than attempt to

destroy it by apprehensions and misgivings, why not endeavour to strengthen the power of government, by connecting with it the relations and advantages arising out of the national representation?

CONCLUSION.

The late events have left traces behind them which are observable throughout Europe; wheresoever travellers direct their steps, they are struck with a picture of the calamities arising out of the revolutions that have convulsed Spain, Portugal, and Italy for the last four years; banished refugees are to be seen in one place; in another, those upon whom a sentence of death has been passed, have been forced to take shelter in some remote corner of the earth. Countries which heaven has gifted with such ample stores for the happiness of their inhabitants, now exhibit to our view the desolation of families mourning for

the absence of husbands, of children, of parents, whose properties are either confiscated or sequestered, or have fallen a prey to dilapidation during the exile of their owners; the banks of the Po, of the Tesino, the Guadalquivir, the Rubicon, and the Arethuse re-echo their lamentations. The afflictions entailed by outlawry, the horrors of dungeons, have spread general dismay over Italy, a land that must ever be dear to our recollection; at the same moment that the mountains and the plains of ancient Iberia are deluged with the blood of numerous victims, sacrificed to a criminal revenge! We find in every direction the agents of the police on the watch, together with the objects of their vigilant attention; the mistrust created in governments by the late events is universally felt in its effects; there is a general apprehension of meeting with persons that are either compromised, or intentionally represented as such; everywhere the police is called upon by the

diplomatic body to keep a strict watch over the opinions, the habits, the conversation of the natives and of foreigners; and Europe, after having been kept in a state of fear and alarm by the most colossal military power; after having trembled, as it were, during ten years at the threats of the French police, is convulsed by repeated agitations at a time when it stands in so much need of tranquillity and happiness: it has only exchanged the state of apprehension in which it was held by one power for a state of permanent internal mistrust!—the hostility of egotism has taken the place of that confidence which subsisted between princes and their people, when kings on the one side were considered but as victims of their high station, and the people on the other but as faithful and devoted subjects: —and wherefore this change? Because one class of individuals has attempted to separate the interests of subjects from those of their rulers, and to bring them into collision upon

points which might otherwise be adjusted by the mutual consent of both parties, without being productive of insurrection or revolt.

I am firmly convinced, that had it not been for the agitation and imprudent measures of a party, which, in the very outset of the new order of things showed an intention of stirring up a spirit of independence; for the constant employment of expressions menacing to every government; for the political applauses, shouts, and plaudits issuing from the precincts of some college; for some scandalous elections; for language partly in the shape of prophecy, partly of threats, which was often indiscreet, and at all times ill-judged;—the cabinets of Europe would have pursued a totally different course of politics; for there were several august sovereigns who thought that their nations should be placed in a different attitude from that which had heretofore characterised them. The events that led to the restoration of the lawful princes had given evidence of the new wants of

their states, and of all the advantages that might be derived from the moral position of the people: but threats of the insubordination of the people and of a rising, were constantly held out to the ruling power; and it was positively asserted that this resistance was founded upon the general will, and that it was proper to give way to it! Such a threat, it must be allowed, was calculated to spread the alarm, and afforded to the cabinets and the sovereigns a motive, which was not neglected, for leaguing together, and giving another direction to the plans they had originally laid down.

It was natural to suppose that after the first alarm had subsided, the people would have to contend against the arrayed powers of all regularly established authorities, which were about to assume an attitude of resistance to their encroachments. In this manner mistrust and hostility took the place of that harmony which ought to have become, between nations and their governments, the

cement of the new epocha of restored legitimacy; by which name I also qualify the return of all sovereigns to the states from whence they had been expelled.

The revolutions of Spain, of Italy, and of Portugal, rent the veil which had concealed the want of union of those nations, that had been represented as like the head of Medusa, and took away from the people all those advantages which they had hitherto enjoyed.

The only thing that has been really changed in Europe is the object of the policy of the different cabinets. Therefore this change, the most remarkable of our era, will fix the new diplomatic code to the nineteenth century.

The groundwork of European diplomacy, in former times, consisted in a mutual distrust of aggrandising projects, in a jealousy of the power or prosperity of a neighbouring state; European policy was called into action by the conquest of a province, the erection of a harbour, of a fortress, or of a

line of frontiers; the rights of pre-eminence due for the relationship of royal families; the due consideration for embassadors for family connexions; protection of smaller states; these, and many other objects created for each court a distinct and separate interest.

The people were then considered in no other light than that of a passive mass, serving to give splendour to the crown, at the same time, in the uninterrupted enjoyment of public happiness, so long as it fulfilled its duties to the throne and to the state. Every thing now bears another aspect; the eyes of governments are chiefly directed at present to the conduct of the people. The cabinets are no longer disturbed by a spirit of mutual jealousy, hostility, or mistrust; the views of governments and of sovereigns are wholly directed to the permanent preservation of hereditary power, to its security against insurrections or democratical influence, to the protection and guarantee of existing rights.

The agitation of the public mind, to which alone is to be attributed this watchful alarm, must necessarily enjoin a state of peace to the continental powers; and the different cabinets will remain amicably united, kings will appear as the members of one family joined in common league for the support of their rights, so long as the people may evince a factious disposition, or so long as their threats may warn the existing authorities to be on their guard. The return of nations to order; moderation on the part of those who are allowed to give vent to their sentiments; the discretion of writers, who, though not called upon to applaud abuses, may point them out without having recourse to rash language, which would afford weapons to those who watch every indication of discontent; and lastly, the cautious and prudent demeanour of all classes, will be the only means of removing the mistrust of European governments, or of bringing the cabinets back to the former view of their sepa-

rate interests. The mechanism of social order must, in my opinion, be much more benefited by the system which prevailed in former times, because the people were then engaged by exterior objects, were called away from the focus of agitation to partake of a glory that possesses more attraction, whilst it gives to princes greater lustre, and a greater degree of security and political weight.

Is it not madness to assume at every moment a tone of menace and of prophecy—to speak of the general discontent and indignation—to boast with assurance of a triumph—or of certain projects as on the point of breaking out? All this is done for no other purpose than to persuade us, that those who have been hitherto bound to obey have reason on their side; that those who command are in the wrong; and that sooner or later the general will must be allowed to take its course. Can it therefore be expected that governments and kings, in whose hands rests the physical strength of society,

and who have, at different periods, waged war against feudal lords, the pope, or corporations indiscriminately, when these several powers appeared to compromise their security, should now discard all mistrust, and remain quiet spectators of events, or lie in wait for the meditated attack? There is inconsistency, or rather madness in such an idea. I must again repeat, that, if at the commencement of the restorations, wisdom and moderation had been brought into play; if advice had been given unaccompanied by threats; if a disposition had been evinced to mix up old interests with new ones; if, instead of justifying the French revolution, and whatever was connected with it, that subject had by common consent been forgotten or laid aside, nations would have gained what their conduct has lost to them.

The revolutions of Italy, of Spain, and of Portugal, have retarded the happiness of nations, and removed to a very indefinite period that state of confidence and mutual harmony

which ought to prevail in the relations between subjects and their sovereigns. What has been the result of those fruitless convulsions which have only tended to provoke the severity and the anger of governments? They have given a false attitude to society, whether in regard to its political state, or to the condition of the finances. As respects the one, we need only point out the necessity of maintaining a foreign army for the guarantee of public safety; governments are thus compelled to resort to foreign aid in order to rule their own states, a course which affords no indication of independence. By that position apprehensions have been created of arrests and proscriptions on the one side, or disorder and a fatal anarchy on the other. As respects the finances, the present administration of those countries that have been seduced into revolt is quite at variance with the public resources: the consequence is, that the government and the people are in a state of constraint, which is necessa-

rily productive of an irritation and bitterness, equally opposed to that well regulated order and confidence, the only sources of improvement for the political condition of a country.

The financial means of a state just emerging from a revolution, must necessarily be much exhausted; and before the administrative authority has recovered its wonted vigour, it has already contracted fresh obligations towards the power through whose support public order has been restored; but the discharge of those obligations is opposed by many obstacles, because the revolution just ended had called for pecuniary sacrifices, and in a country, a prey to insurrection, all classes are equally poor and discontented. The impossibility of raising in a very short time funds of sufficient magnitude to meet the existing wants, is another difficulty to be added to the preceding ones; and likewise, that excessive distrust which the authority feels after such events, and which leaves it no other alternative but that of rigo-

rous measures, and of expences unproductive of national prosperity; the deplorably low price of provisions occasioned by the endless openings afforded for the overflowing commodities of the four quarters of the globe, and the consequent reduction in the price of labour, and in the employment of the agricultural classes;—such is the picture which presents a too faithful idea of the condition of nations, who, after having been subjected to sacrifices pretended to be *voluntary* on their part, are now called upon for more, without having the means of making them. What is the course adopted for repairing this evil? Loans are resorted to; debts are contracted; a *provisionary* system is set on foot; and nations are left to expect from the workings of time, and that very distant, the return of those advantages and of that condition which the late events had taken from them. When I speak of advantages, I particularly allude to the enjoyment of such as the mass of the people exercised over their governments,

by means of public opinion, where the latter had for their object the improvement in the condition of men, who, owing to the changes in political institutions, in industry, and in public wealth, were no longer able to keep within the bounds prescribed by the establishments of former days; it is thus the workings of time and of necessity have been rendered abortive by attempts to anticipate the future by the most absurd proceedings.

Can all nations really feel the want of a constitution? This is the main question, which it is the more interesting to discuss, as it forms the principal object of those who are supposed to feel a real interest in the fate of humanity.

I have already argued this question in an Italian pamphlet, published in 1820. It will therefore be sufficient to repeat the observations which I presented at that period, since no change has occurred that would justify a departure from them.

It is alleged that the progress of civilisation has made it imperative upon men to better their condition; and that this improvement chiefly consists in giving to the people a national representation, which will afford to them a share of power, by the expression of their free consent to the taxes they are called upon to pay, and a protection to their interests, their rights, and their liberties. Does the necessity, however, of a representative government exist in reality for all nations? Are they even calculated to understand the importance of the state to which it is attempted to raise them? And moreover, are they capable of exercising the functions which are reserved for them?

Nothing but an inward sense of dignity can create a desire for civil or political independence. This feeling, which is neither an instinct nor a virtue, should be produced by the expansion of intellectual powers, and can only result from a knowledge of those rights in

which a participation is claimed. In order to attain to this degree of civilisation, it is not sufficient to prepare before hand the public education, which is partly dependant upon the habits or dispositions of a people, upon its language, its tastes, and even its geographical position; but it is necessary also that some partial change should have been previously effected in the ancient institutions, which the structure of the old monarchies and governments supported.

All nations do not exhibit these indispensible conditions. In some, the ancient laws, statutes, customs, and political order have experienced no alteration. They consequently present indications of the same feelings, the same habits, and the same ideas. In others, composed of several provinces, are to be found elements which are directly at variance with a concentration of power; unity of will, and unity of action are therefore beyond their reach. As to that species of civilisation

which applies to the display of intellectual faculties, and to the knowledge derived from reading, &c. it is well known that the mass of the people in some of the southern nations, in a part of Germany, and of the Russian empire, as well as in many other countries, are still living in a state of absolute ignorance. Deprived of the many resources of a general instruction which has been rendered so easy of attainment for all classes, they neither feel the want nor the ambition of acquiring knowledge. Journals, pamphlets, and periodical works are very scarce amongst them, and are only known to individuals of high rank, or to persons in public situations. What we understand by the public, have no other ideas than such as are created by their habits or their wants, or that are occasionally suggested to them.

With respect to geographical position, every state, whose locality deprives it of the advantages of commerce, is deficient of that inter-

course with foreign countries, which gives an impulse to industry and speculation, and consequently a new vigour to national sentiment. Civilisation has made more rapid progress in commercial towns, because they may be considered to be the emporium of the knowledge, as they are of the commodities, of foreign nations. The spirit of curiosity that stimulates all merchants, and keeps them incessantly on the watch for every intelligence that may turn their operations to some advantage, always gives to their character a stamp of independence, which their wealth contributes to maintain. But this branch of civilisation, which invigorates every exertion and gives activity to private interests and ambitions, is beyond the reach of the mass of the population, who are deprived of all commerce, whether owing to local circumstances, to a want of sufficient industry, of capital, or of encouragement; whether, in short, the cause be in the system of great vested proprieties, or in obstacles of any other kind. Thus a great part of Europe,

so far from being in civil or political agitation, finds repose in its state of happy indifference, contracted by the force of habit, in considering life as valuable only in its present enjoyment. Customs, rather than the laws, form the mechanism of these societies. *To do what has been done before*, such is the theory which they have taken for their guide. It rarely happens that the actions of its members have a tendency to anticipate the future, or to go out of their old track.

The real object of the people is to complete their daily labour, and to secure that habitual existence with which all their ideas are connected. To speak to them of their rights, and of the advantages of a representative government, would be tantamount to addressing them in an unintelligible language. They hold their ancient monarchies in a sort of religious awe, and consider them as the tutelary protectors of social organisation. The laws never alter their habits, nor bear heavily upon their fate, and if there be any thing arbitrary or absolute

in the system, in the practice it is otherwise. They could never be made to feel the want of a change in their condition, except by the untractable and tyrannical character of their sovereign.

I repeat it, there are people to be found in Europe, who cannot be made to desire a condition different from the existing one; there are certainly others, who vaguely dream of some change, but are without any central point of action, whether from the difference of dialects, the obstacle that first presents itself to a uniform expression of will,—or from a difference in the development of their moral sentiments, which occasions no less a disparity in their respective ideas,—or from the slowness of an impulse which is not susceptible of being accelerated, owing to the difficulties which the peculiar temper of individuals throws in the way. For those nations, the general impulse of the age is not *active*, but *prospective*; their character is the same as in

former times; they carry with them the stamp of past ages, like the patrimony of an old political existence. The springs of their governments, their feudal position, their habits, and consequently their ideas, have remained unchanged.

We feel a degree of interest in viewing the actual frame of certain societies pictured in characters that take us back to the ages which have gone before them: the solemn and calm appearance of a people modelled according to the old monarchical institutions; the passive obedience which distinguishes millions of men, whose inactive character, and whose content in a sphere of humble existence can never lead them on to disturb the interior of palaces by clamours of discontent and innovation, or to make the public places re-echo a single sound of politics; and lastly, that confidence, which entire populations repose in their sovereigns, whom they hold in the light of fathers and of protectors,—all combine to inspire an

interest not unlike that which is felt at contemplating the happiness of an honest and numerous family.

People of such patriarchal simplicity are unacquainted with any more energetic appeal than that of warlike sounds in the field. They rush forward at those sounds, and feel happy to sacrifice their lives in battle as an offering to their prince. The most eloquent address for them is the order of their chief, the finest theory is that of obedience, and the highest enjoyment that which is derived from thoughtless mirth. Thus, as nations are to be found in whom the impulse of intellectual expansion cannot be kept within bounds, there are others, on the contrary, in whom that impulse ought never to be hurried on.

Each nation has its particular age; they reach their state of manhood by different gradations. To such a disparity in the condition of the people is to be ascribed, that institutions of government cannot bear the same character, or

at least be all alike at the same time; and although the new social doctrine (that of giving to all men a share in political rights) rests its foundation upon the nature of primitive rights, history, however, teaches us that the mass of the people have assumed an obedient demeanour in preference to any other; and it is quite clear that they have maintained that position for a much longer time than the one which they have attempted to substitute for it, when they have aimed at becoming partakers in the rights enjoyed by their rulers. It is, perhaps, a very mortifying confession, but there can be no doubt that the annals of nations present to our view a series of ages, during which mankind could appear in no other character than as bondsmen, and have seldom known how to be free whenever they have desired freedom: when success has attended their efforts, it has been beyond their power to avoid the dreadful abyss of crimes with which their triumphs have been stained! There are exceptions to this charge,

but they are of very rare occurrence: an evident proof of the difficulty which exists of giving a proper organisation to governments, when the mass of the people take to themselves a share of the supreme authority. The metamorphosis of a nation into a representative government from a system of obedience, is the most difficult work of the human mind. If it be not attained by degrees, and after having prepared all the elements that are requisite for a national representation, no other result will be derived than the disorganisation of a state, the inflaming of every passion, which will then be let loose upon society, when such society is not sufficiently matured for giving them a beneficial direction.

After these considerations, which cannot escape the judgment of sensible men, it must be allowed, that an indiscriminate appeal to all nations with the view of improving their condition, and as an inducement for them to live under the sway of a constitutional government,

is an act of great absurdity, to say the least of it. It is pretending to desire for others what they have no wish to obtain; it is, moreover, ensnaring them into a political schism, in order to procure for them a condition which it would not be in their power to maintain*.

Although it be far from my object to set myself up as the exclusive apologist of paternal governments, wherein the happiness of subjects is dependant upon their sovereign, and an arbitrary and despotic will might, from one moment to another, be substituted for the moral charac-

* Without speaking of Europe, America will, for a time, justify the truth of this assertion. It will either be tossed from one insurrection into another, or brought under the former sway; or else become independent, though subjected to the influence of one or more chiefs who may attempt to defend their country: it will be alike unable to proceed in its career unassisted, recover its equilibrium, or to fix its destiny according to the course which has been contemplated for it. America is yet without the necessary means for ranging itself in such a political attitude and station, as would otherwise entitle it to national confidence.

ter and personal goodness of a prince who has entitled himself to the blessings of his subjects; it must, however, be confessed, that some nations are found to live contented under such governments, because there are whole populations which, in their quiet insignificance, cannot dispense with all those special protections that are bestowed upon them by autocratic governments. These nations, besides the impossibility of their being able to discharge the higher duties of society, would find, in their nature and condition, a great obstacle to their acquiring the activity requisite for political independence.

Wherever habits prevail, and laws are few in number, society proceeds in an order which custom has consecrated. There is seldom any change in the will of princes; and the influence of ministers is not felt, because every thing is regulated by a kind of method which is never attempted to be disturbed. In those countries, absolute power really becomes paternal

in its effects, and all that is required is, that a sovereign be not a capricious reformer. Were this to be the case, he would have to apprehend nothing from the nation, but every thing from the aristocracy, the only class which is jealous of his power. Wherever that oligarchy exists in the enjoyment of all its consequence and its privileges, it must be altered before the government can be modified, and cease to be what it had been, before the people can be allowed to change their present situation. The inhabitants of such countries will remain for a long time in their former state without complaining of it.

A paternal authority has difficulties to encounter when nations have lost their habits; when the nobles have been brought down to an equality with other classes by the loss of their ancient privileges; when, in short, the events that closed the eighteenth century have changed the ancient political edifice. In endeavouring to recover *their level*, the people, who

are no longer guided by old usages, have fallen into a kind of *political uneasiness* for want of a central point that may give them a unity of action. Thus the paternal governments are under the necessity of confining by force of arms their *turbulent vacillation*, in order to govern a country which has shaken off its former habits; and they attempt to resort to the same means that they employ towards those who live in a state of immoveable tranquillity, or of uncultivated bondage: then it is governments cease to be paternal, for they find themselves opposed to the existing condition of the people.

Societies and nations are the same as individuals, who, by their different structure, the disparity in their resources, the greater or less expansion of intellect, are compelled to keep at a considerable distance from one another; and if the natural disposition can in a great measure be subdued or directed by education, the active progress of this public education can alone produce the change which might be

effected in favor of a different political organisation of any state. Order and repose are two powerful guarantees in favour of existing institutions; and it is only in those countries where the one has been overturned and the other destroyed, that they can never be restored by the same means that were formerly found to be sufficient for preserving them unimpaired.

THE END

PRINTED BY HOWLETT AND BRIMMER, 111 STREET, ST

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zed with financial assistance fro
Government of Maharashtra
on 02 January, 2016